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 SUMMARY 
The Singapore government has recently announced an ambitious safety target to 
bring down the workplace fatalities to less than 2.5 per 100,000 workers by 2015, 
with a further reduction to 1.8 per 100,000 workers by 2018 (Workplace Safety 
and Health Council, 2011). Improving the current design, audit and development 
of the construction safety management system is one of the key strategies to 
achieve this objective.  
 
The current practice is to mandate a comprehensive construction safety 
management system which is more appropriate to large companies, leaving the 
issue of defining a cost-effective construction safety management system for 
small and medium-sized projects unresolved. In addition, for some projects and 
organizations which have to adopt more than one safety standard, there is no 
systematic design methodology to guide the integration of standards, resolving 
their differences and overlaps, thus leading to duplicated effort during the 
development and implementation of the safety management system.   
 
Singapore has promoted the Construction Safety Audit Scoring System 
(ConSASS) as a standard audit tool to conduct an independent safety 
management system audit and to provide comparable audit results across 
multiple construction worksites. However, audit subjectivity reduces the reliability 
and comparability of audit results across multiple projects. Moreover, determining 
the intent and purpose of certain audit questions and finding out how to achieve 
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them through implementing safety practices has been left to the discretion of the 
safety staff themselves.  The current audit scheme involving band levels across 
multiple safety management system elements is also inconsistent. This brings 
about difficulty in distinguishing weaker elements. It also cannot characterize the 
overall performance of the safety management system as a whole, thus bringing 
about confusion when setting development priorities for further safety 
management system improvement. 
 
This research proposes a two dimensional framework ConSASS-2D to guide the 
design, audit and planning of a construction safety management system. 
ConSASS-2D consists of grouped process areas with each process area 
structured by goals and supporting practices. The two fundamental dimensions of 
this framework include the capability dimension characterized by increasing 
capability levels, and a maturity dimension which characterizes the overall 
systemic qualities of the safety management system. The capability dimension 
provides a systematic and logical basis for the design and audit of individual 
process areas.  The study of a particular process area has been undertaken to 
obtain the definitions of process area components and the logical relationship 
between them. The study has addressed the practical issue of how to integrate 
different standards pertaining to the activities within the process area. The 
maturity dimension of ConSASS-2D improves a safety management system by 
addressing groups of process areas. The role and contribution of the grouped 
process areas towards the overall qualities of the safety management system has 
been elaborated in the definition of maturity levels.   
  x 
A case study has been conducted to describe the audit scheme of an individual 
process area which is consistent across all process areas. The appraisal of the 
system maturity level, which indicates the development stage of the safety 
management system, has also been described. A development strategy has been 
recommended based on the ConSASS-2D audit results of the safety management 
system.  
 
Keywords: construction, safety management, process area, capability, maturity, 
development strategy.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Construction Safety in Singapore 
Construction safety is of great concern because construction is one of the most 
dangerous occupations, worldwide and also in Singapore (Imriyas et al., 2007). 
Since Singapore embarked on her industrialization program in the early 1960s, 
the construction industry has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
economy (Sia, 2001). It is therefore not surprising that safety and health issues 
became serious concerns in the early 1970s. The safety situation deteriorated so 
drastically that the government had to bring in legislation pertaining to specific 
safety aspects to deal with each emerging serious safety problem (Ahmad, 1996). 
Since 1974, the national Construction Safety Campaign has been held each year 
(The contractor, 1993, 1998). The construction industry in Singapore has realized 
that safety on site requires the existence of a good site safety management 
system incorporating essential safety programs (Debrah and Ofori, 2001), and the 
audit of the safety management system to ensure its effectiveness (Teo and 
Phang, 2005).  
 
The Workplace Safety and Health statistics published by the Ministry of 
Manpower, Singapore (Workplace Safety and Health Report, 2011) reveal that, 
over the past three years, the number of fatalities in the construction sector still 
accounted for more than one third of all workplace fatalities (Figure 1.1), and the 
fatality rate is far higher than the average level among all the industries in 
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Singapore (Figure 1.2). Fatality rate refers to the number of workplace fatalities 
per 100,000 persons employed (Health and Safety Executive, 2008).   
 
The construction industry fatality rate in 2011 was 5.3 per 100,000 workers 
(Figure 1.2). Even so, the Ministry of Manpower announced an ambitious safety 
target to halve the number of workplace fatalities to 2.5 per 100,000 workers by 
2015, with a further reduction to 1.8 per 100,000 workers by 2018 (Workplace 
Safety and Health Council, 2011). This challenging target has prompted the 
government, industries, and researchers to examine various strategies of 
enhancing safety performance on the construction site. Improving the current 
design, audit and development of the safety management system can be part of 
the strategy to achieve this quantum leap.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Number of fatalities in the Construction Sector compared to All Sectors, 
2006-2011 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
1.2.1 Difficulties in the Design of Construction Safety Management Systems 
 In Singapore, construction site safety is governed by the requirements stipulated 
under the Factories Act (Chapter 104). The Factories (Building Operations and 
Work of Engineering Construction) (BOWEC) Regulations, 1994 was augmented 
to further protect the safety and health of workers (Teo et al., 2005). The BOWEC 
Regulations require all construction worksites that have contract values of S$10 
million or more to implement a safety management system based on the Code of 
Practice on Construction Safety Management Systems (Code of Practice 79) (The 
Contractor, 1994).  
 
Code of Practice 79 consists of 14 main safety management elements, and each 
element provides specific guidelines on how construction firms should organize 
  4 
and manage their sites to ensure the safety of their personnel and the public 
(Code of Practice 79, 1999). The Government has encouraged the management 
of smaller projects with a contract sum below S$10 million to set up safety 
management systems and conduct safety audits of the system as well (Sia, 
2001). However, it may not be cost-effective and can be challenging to implement 
all the safety elements simultaneously to the required standard for these small 
and even medium-sized construction firms (Lee, 1992).  
 
A safety certification scheme has also been promoted to encourage and enhance 
safety awareness, promote safe work practices and raise the safety standards of 
the construction industry. The safety recognition of construction firms has been 
promoted through the certification of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Management System (OHSMS) (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2012). This is achieved 
by ensuring that the firms fulfill the Occupational Health and Safety Assessment 
Scheme (OHSAS) 18001 which specifies the requirements for an organization to 
control its occupational health and safety risks to improve its performance (British 
Standard Institute, 1999). Singapore Standard 506 is adapted from OHSAS 18001 
(Singapore Standard 506, 2009).  
 
From the previous discussion, it appears that in order to achieve high levels of 
safety excellence, the safety management system of construction worksites needs 
to satisfy both Code of Practice 79 and Singapore Standard 506. These two 
standards overlap each other. They have been developed independently, and by 
different sponsoring groups; even in the areas which overlap, their requirements 
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differ from each other because each has a different development approach and 
emphasis. The lack of an appropriate integration method leads to duplication and 
inconsistency during the development and implementation of the safety 
management system. 
 
1.2.2 Problems of Construction Safety Management System Auditing  
In Singapore, a worksite with a contract sum of S$30 million or more is required to 
appoint an approved independent external auditing organization to audit the 
safety management system of the worksite at least once every 6 months 
(Contractor, 1994). However, there is no standard protocol on how safety auditing 
is to be conducted and each safety auditing firm has its own audit checklist, based 
on the broad guidelines laid down in Code of Practice 79. Moreover, approved 
auditing organizations use their own scoring system to grade the performance of 
the implementation of safety management systems at the worksites (Teo and Ling, 
2006).  
 
The use of different checklists and a lack of a standardized scoring system pose 
challenges when differentiating worksites in terms of the effectiveness and 
implementation of their safety management system (Huat and Meng, 2007). A 
cross comparison between worksites in terms of the effectiveness of their safety 
management system is necessary to motivate contractors to strive for 
improvement in managing safety and health risks at their worksites.  
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The Construction Safety Audit Scoring System (ConSASS) is an audit tool which 
tries to provide a standardized checklist and scoring system to assess the 
capabilities of worksites in managing safety and health risks. There are about 300 
audit questions in the ConSASS audit checklist. An approved safety auditor was 
interviewed during the ConSASS audit of Medical Building 6 of National University 
of Singapore. He said that: “The ConSASS audit questions are tedious.” The 
interview also revealed that ConSASS does not distinguish between the intent 
and purpose of the audit questions. The questions in the ConSASS audit checklist 
are grouped into bands, from Band I to IV, with each higher band level reflecting 
the increased level of development of the elements being audited. For a system 
element, to move from one band level to the next higher band, at least 70% audit 
questions need to be satisfied (Huat and Meng, 2007). But it is not clear why and 
how this 70% was defined.   
 
Both the approved safety auditor and the safety officer indicated that ConSASS 
does not specify or provide guidance on the safety practices required to satisfy 
certain audit questions. Different safety auditors have different opinions about how 
certain audit questions should be satisfied. Therefore, for the same worksites 
audited at about the same time, different auditors can arrive at different audit 
results for some of the audit questions. This subjectivity reduces the comparability 
of audit results across worksites. Inconsistent audit results generated from these 
audit questions may reduce the confidence in audit results, and pose challenges 
when assessing the effectiveness of safety management systems.  
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The ConSASS score card is a „final report card‟ which tabulates the achievement 
of the system elements in terms of the band levels obtained. An interview with a 
Senior Manager of the Office of Estate and Development of National University of 
Singapore revealed that, although ConSASS score card provides a quick and 
easy visualization of the audited results, the weaker system elements cannot be 
readily distinguished. Therefore, it does not give the management of the company 
an idea of effort / resource allocation to strengthen weak areas to develop the 
system further. This may be because, according to the ConSASS User Guide 
(Huat and Meng, 2007) and ConSASS audit checklist, the meaning of the four 
band levels have been defined individually for each system element, and is not 
consistent across all the system elements, even though the band levels are 
numerically the same. Beyond reporting on specific deficiencies of the system 
elements, the audit results do not give a clear picture as to the level of capability 
of the system elements, nor the overall performance of the safety management 
system as a whole.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research is to propose an improved basis for the 
development and audit of construction safety management systems. The proposal 
rests on a two dimensional framework ConSASS-2D to guide the design, audit 
and development activities. ConSASS-2D will adopt a process-centric view of a 
safety management system, and organize safety management activities into 
several distinct process areas. The specific objectives of this research are given 
below: 
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Objective 1 – To organize generic safety management activities into process 
areas and identify concepts for the design of individual process areas. 
Objective 2 – To organize concepts into a procedure to audit and develop 
individual process areas.  
Objective 3 – To organize concepts into a framework suitable for the appraisal 
and development of a safety management system as a whole.    
 
1.4 Significance of Study 
ConSASS-2D provides projects and organizations a systematic methodology to 
guide the design of individual process areas with a clear purpose and priority 
among safety activities. This also forms the basis of standards integration to 
resolve their differences and overlaps. A logical and consistent audit scheme 
reduces audit subjectivity and increases the confidence and comparability of audit 
results. Consistent capability level definitions for individual process areas have 
been defined, and relatively weaker process areas can be distinguished. Overall 
safety management system performance can be characterized by maturity levels 
enabling a development strategy for the system as a whole. Process capability 
and system maturity offer a flexible way of taking a construction safety 
management system through different developmental stages. This is likely to be 
of benefit to small and medium-sized construction companies hoping to benefit 
from a safety management system of the appropriate scope for their projects. 
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters, beginning with this chapter. Chapter 2 
reviews the research on construction safety management systems and the way 
they are audited. The idea of process improvement is included in the review. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this study. Chapter 4 elaborates on the 
capability dimension of ConSASS-2D. Chapter 5 introduces the maturity 
dimension ConSASS-2D. Chapter 6 presents the case studies conducted in this 
research.  Chapter 7 compares the properties of ConSASS-2D with that of 
ConSASS. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main 
contributions of the research, its limitations and recommendations for future study. 
 
  10 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This research proposes the ConSASS-2D framework to guide the design, audit 
and planning of a safety management system. Relevant literature has been 
reviewed to identify the gaps between the current status of safety management 
system development and the expectations of the construction industry.  
 
2.1 An Overview of Construction Safety in Singapore 
Construction is a key industry contributing around 3.9% of gross domestic product 
in Singapore (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2011). It is also characterized 
by continual changes, various technologies, working conditions and the 
coordination of different trades and operations (Niskanen and Lauttalammi, 1989). 
Due to these characteristics, construction activities are inherently hazardous and 
risky from the perspective of accidents and injuries, and the resultant safety 
record is relatively poor (Salminen, 1995). Therefore, it benefits companies to 
manage safety on their projects and worksites. 
 
In Singapore, there was an early ‘firefighting‟ stage in the development of 
thoughts regarding safety during which numerous ad-hoc safety programs were 
developed. For example, all workers are required to take a safety orientation 
course before starting work in the industry; specific practices relating to safety on 
site are laid down for contractors to follow; the frequency of inspections of sites 
has been progressively increased in order to ensure that proper practices are 
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adopted; contractors are required to employ various categories of persons with 
qualifications and responsibilities for safety in relation to the size of their projects; 
the Singapore Contractors’ Association Ltd has formed a safety consultancy 
subsidiary to assist its members; the number of days for which the contractor has 
worked without any accident on site is declared on hoardings and awards are 
given by the Ministry of Manpower for safety performance and annual safety 
awareness campaigns are organized by the Ministry of Manpower (Debrah and 
Ofori, 2001). This was followed by the gradual consolidation and amalgamation of 
these disparate safety programs into a safety management system (Jannadi and 
Bu-Khamsin, 2002). As a result, safety management systems have been 
promoted as an effective tool to manage safety issues and concerns.  
 
2.2 The Breadth of Safety Management Systems 
The safety management system is a set of interrelated elements to establish 
safety policy and objectives, and develop procedures to achieve those objectives 
(International Labor Organization, 2001). An example of a safety management 
system description can be found in either Code of Practice 79 or Singapore 
Standard 506. There have been numerous studies suggesting which particular 
elements are essential or should be included in a construction safety 
management system (Hinze, 1997, Heberle, 1998), resulting in more and more 
elements being involved. However, the concurrent implementation of a large 
number of safety elements in order to achieve an approved safety management 
system does not equate to effective safety performance, and is impractical for 
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many (small) employers since the resources and budget of these entities are 
limited (Champoux and Brun, 2003).    
 
Some researchers have tried to solve this problem by prioritizing the elements of 
safety management systems, e.g., the Analytic Hierarchy Process has been used 
to determine the priorities of safety management system elements (Chan et al., 
2004, Tam et al., 2002). However, even with prioritized elements, projects and 
organizations still cannot figure out the scope and scale of the implementation of a 
safety management system to meet the safety needs or expectations of their 
projects, e.g., how many elements are to be selected from a priority list in order to 
achieve a certain level of functionality and performance.  
 
Hallowell and Gambatese (2007) proposed a formal model for the selection of 
safety elements to address this problem by incorporating a stopping criterion. The 
elements included are considered to be sufficient when the capacity (capability) of 
safety risk mitigation that they provide exceeds the safety needs or expectations 
of the project. The value assignments used in their risk mitigation model is based 
on the specifics of the work activities of each project. These will be different for 
each project and will need to be re-established every time a safety management 
system is created for a new project. 
 
These proposals for prioritization focused only on the individual element and paid 
less attention to the interrelation of the elements (Kim et al. 2005). The interlinking 
of the procedures, rules and other management tools to form a functioning safety 
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management system was still an open question for research (Steen, 1996). 
Priority setting according to the importance or ability of risk mitigation without 
considering the logical relationship between elements cannot guide the sequence 
of safety management system implementation. For example, it is logical that 
elements concerning planning should precede those about monitoring and control 
because without the former, there will be no procedures to monitor. The 
determination of priorities often entails subjective evaluation, especially during the 
pairwise comparisons. The calculation of relative priorities from the many pairwise 
comparisons involves a complicated procedure which is difficult to understand and 
tedious to perform.   
 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) provides priorities for sets of 
process areas. CMMI was proposed for process improvement in the software 
industry and later was widely used in many other industries (Humphrey, 1988). Its 
process improvement strategy based on maturity levels has been adopted for 
system development by many researchers. For example, a Standardized Process 
Improvement for Construction Enterprises framework has been proposed for the 
construction industry to assess the performance of an organization against levels 
of maturity (Sarshar et al., 2004). However, this framework does not address 
safety management per se, since its scope is much broader and safety may be 
just one of many concerns covered.  
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2.3 Elaborating System Elements  
Several studies have suggested how specific safety aspects can be developed 
and implemented to incorporate accumulated experience. Many studies have 
identified „best practices‟ that can be incorporated into safety management 
systems (Saurin et al., 2008), but a list of „best practices‟ is left to the experience 
and preference of individual project managers. Simply elaborating on system 
elements alone may result in more and more details of implementation; the result 
may become too complex and onerous for the majority of (small) employers 
(Haslam et al., 2005, Heinrich et al., 1980). For example, the Code of Practice on 
Workplace Safety and Health Risk Management details the steps for the risk 
management process (WSH, 2012). Since there are many factors to consider, it 
may be too complicated for firms at the commencement of the project. It would be 
better if projects could have the basics in place at the outset of the project, then 
elaborate and customize their safety management system in light of the 
expectation of the project as they evolve. This means that system elements ought 
to be viewed as a hierarchy of goals / tasks and the hierarchy „deepened‟ by 
successively elaborating sub-goals.  
 
The issue of effective implementation in the face of limited resources has been 
raised and the primary solution is to identify key practices which have priority over 
other practices (Paulk et al. 1993). It was realized that the management of 
construction safety could be viewed as an ongoing process (Hale et al., 1997). A 
primary process architecture which describes the technical and management 
activities required for proper execution of the development process was proposed 
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later (Paulk, 2009). In the construction safety domain, more attention has been 
paid to evaluate the development status of system elements, rather than providing 
guidance for the development of the system elements.  
 
2.4 The Scope of a Safety Management System 
The scope of a safety management system encompasses both the breadth of the 
safety management system (the system elements included), and the depth of the 
safety management system (the level of detail with which individual elements are 
implemented). Till now, there is no methodology which enables construction 
organizations to customize the scope of a safety management system. The scope 
of each safety management system is different depending on needs, expectations 
and availability of resources of the project.  
 
This research explores ideas for characterizing the scope of a safety management 
system. The idea is based on the concept of maturity level which progressively 
develops a safety management system by increasing the functionality covered by 
the process areas and increasing the sophistication of these functions (Spriggs, 
2000). Projects and organizations could start with a safety management system of 
limited scope, and develop it along the lines suggested in Chapter 6. This will be 
beneficial for small and medium-sized entities which do not have the same level of 
resources as their larger peers. Even large organizations would benefit from the 
orderly development fostered by a better characterization of scope incorporated in 
the design of ConSASS-2D. In effect, the development effort would be become 
more goal-directed.  
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2.5 Measuring Safety Performance  
It is inadequate to just use accident rate as a safety indicator for a single building 
construction site, because per chance, many sites may not experience any 
accidents. It is not possible to determine whether sites with zero accidents are 
safer than sites with a few minor accidents (Mohamed, 2003), because the level 
and quality of effort a project has devoted to safety management is also very 
important. Behavioural observation has been suggested to measure safety 
performance at a construction worksite (Tarrants, 1980). However, in that study, 
the severity of the safety breach was not been taken into account.    
 
The Experience Modification Rating (EMR) determines the cost of workers‟ 
compensation insurance for companies. It is essentially the ratio between actual 
claims filed and expected claims for a particular type of construction. However, 
since the EMR formulae are relatively complex and different versions of 
calculation are used in practice (Everett and Thompson, 1995), the EMR is not an 
appropriate measure of safety performance for all types of companies (Hinze et 
al., 1995). In addition, as the EMR is based on a running average of safety 
outcomes over several years, this method cannot truly reflect the current safety 
performance of companies (Levitt et al., 1987).  
 
The balanced scorecard methodology has been used to provide a fast and 
comprehensive view of a business (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). This can be 
adopted as a measure of the performance of a safety management system.  
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Rather than basing the evaluation on a single measure (accident statistics), the 
balanced score card (BSC) attempts to give a holistic report based on measures 
derived from more diverse but relevant perspectives. For example, expenditures 
on safety equipment and training, the number of workers trained in safe work 
practices, safety measures, and other initiatives are relevant for construction 
safety. Although there is no definitive empirical evidence to show that adopting the 
BSC actually leads to superior performance, anecdotal evidence suggests the 
BSC is increasing in popularity in a variety of applications (BSC, 2000). Its 
application in construction, however, is rather limited (Stewart and Mohamed, 
2000). One major weakness of the existing score card system is that it only takes 
into account the contractor‟s safety performance at a project level without 
considering related factors of the organization (Ng et al., 2005). In addition, there 
is a lack of a solid foundation as to how the weightings for the factors in the score 
card are established.  
 
2.6 The Comprehensiveness of Construction Safety Management System 
Audit   
The safety management system audit is a means of directly and comprehensively 
monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of a firm‟s safety management 
system (Karapetrovic and Willborn, 2000). Researchers have tried to develop 
comprehensive audit checklists (Jannadi and Assaf, 1998). However, the 
correspondence between the number of audit questions and the 
comprehensiveness of the audit is not linear as some essential aspects could be 
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overlooked. A better approach is based on a holistic view of safety management 
system functions and their characteristics.    
 
The audit of a safety management system, as for any other management system, 
normally verifies the existence and implementation of objectives, standards and 
procedures (Mitchison and Papadakis, 1999). Therefore, there is a close 
relationship between the audit system and the specific standard around which it is 
organized. Systems can be made more elaborate and comprehensive by patching 
together two or more standards. To develop a comprehensive audit system, audit 
questions have been designed targeting more than one standard (Huat and Meng, 
2007). Yet, without a clear basis on how this patching or integration is achieved, 
there is the risk that the required effort will not be well organized, or the effort 
might be duplicated in some areas and neglected in others.   
 
Researchers have explored the relation between audit scores and measures of 
safety performance, e.g., Eisner and Leger examined the correlation of safety 
management system audit results with fatality rates and reportable injury rates 
(Eisner and Leger, 1988). The correlations were small, not all in the expected 
direction, and none were statistically significant. Therefore, it is more important to 
see whether adequate effort was spent appropriately and effectively on the 
required aspects.  
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2.7 The Consistency of Audit Questions 
If an audit system cannot objectively or accurately describe the effectiveness of a 
safety management system, it will not be possible to benchmark the effectiveness 
of the construction safety management systems. Inter-rater reliability can reflect 
the consistency of the assessments of the same workplace(s) by different auditors 
(Robson and Bigelow, 2010). A quantitative indicator based on statistical 
properties of audit results was proposed to express inter-rater reliability (Lohr, 
2002), however, there was no further elaboration of the ideas nor suggestions on 
effective ways in dealing with inconsistency in the design of an audit tool.  
 
A systematic methodology is necessary to guide the analysis of the requirements 
of safety standards or audit components (Paulk et al., 1992). The results of 
detailed audit questions and the objective interpretation of facts can support high 
level conclusions. On the other hand, a goal without proper decomposition into 
practices or detailed requirements can result in audit subjectivity because different 
auditors have different ideas about whether or how a goal has been achieved. 
Audit questions should also be clear about whether it is about a goal or a 
supporting practice to achieve a goal since mixing these two types of questions 
will result in duplicated audit effort. Separating goals from practices in audit 
questions enables organizations to determine the purpose of the audit questions.    
 
CMMI proposes capability levels to measure the performance of process areas 
(Garcia and Turner, 2006). Process capability is a forward looking view of an 
organization’s operational processes (Paulk et al., 1995). It focuses on the 
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expected results and can make the outcome of the process areas more 
predictable (Sarshar et al., 2004). Capability, as the quality of being capable, can 
even be assessed through complicated quantitative calculation procedures (Maiti, 
2010). However, those complicated procedures may not be practical for the 
construction industry. Therefore, in this study, the capability levels of ConSASS-
2D have been more simply defined considering its eventual practical application 
on construction work-sites.  
 
2.8 Prioritizing the Improvement Effort Based on Audit Results 
A properly conducted safety audit will determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
the current safety management system, which allows firms to derive the maximum 
benefit from the safety management system consistent with the resources 
deployed (Harrison, 1995). Band levels have been introduced to measure the 
development status of individual system elements (Huat and Meng, 2007). 
However, the definitions of these band levels are inconsistent, resulting in the 
audited band levels of system elements not being comparable. Weaker system 
elements deserving higher priority of resource allocation cannot be distinguished.  
 
The concept of a maturity-criticality (MC) matrix is introduced in biotechnology 
research to determine the priority of system improvement for process areas 
(Steinbacher and Smith, 2009). With one dimension defined to quantify the 
breadth of the system and the other dimension used to quantify the development 
status of individual process areas, an MC score can be calculated by multiplying 
these two quantified indicators. However, as the improvement of process areas 
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cannot be prioritized based on the calculated MC score directly, subjective 
interpretation of the result is still necessary.   
 
2.9 Benchmarking of Audit Results among Worksites 
Benchmarking is described  as „an external focus on internal activities, functions, 
or operations in order to achieve continuous improvement‟ (McNair and Leibfried, 
1992). If the effectiveness of safety management system can be compared, 
contractors will be motivated to strive for improvement in managing safety and 
health risks at their worksites (Huat and Meng, 2007). However, the audit results 
of safety management systems are usually only comparable over time within the 
same unit (Mitchison and Papadakis, 1999), since audit checklists and scoring 
schemes are different from company to company. In spite of these differences, an 
overall indicator of safety performance, Construction Safety Index (CSI), has been 
proposed to quantify the effectiveness of safety management systems. However, 
the CSI requires the collection and processing of data on a very large number of 
attributes (590) (Teo and Ling, 2006). It cannot tell contractors where the 
weaknesses of their safety management system lie since it is an aggregated 
measure.    
 
2.10 Standards Integration 
Multiple standards have been published in the construction industry. For example, 
ISO 9001 is a widely used quality management standard. Zeng and Vivian 
proposed the potential benefit of integrating OHSAS 18001 and ISO 9001 to 
improve safety and quality performance, avoid duplication of procedures and 
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reduce requirements of resources and conflicts of procedures (Zeng et al., 2008). 
They cited a model of safety-focused quality management (SQM) having three 
processing stages: planning, integration and installation (Pun and Hui, 2002). 
However, these three stages only briefly describe the general procedures in each 
stage without elaboration on the composition of each element (Saksvik and 
Quinlan, 2003). The system architecture for integration is also not specified nor 
how differences, similarities and complementarities between two systems can be 
handled (Mutafelija and Stromberg, 2008). As such, it leaves the detail and 
difficulty of standards integration to management (Spector and Beer, 1994). A 
systematic methodology to guide the integration across standards dealing with 
their differences and overlaps is still very much an open question for research.  
 
2.11 Summary 
Current safety management system guidelines lack the flexibility to provide 
projects and organizations the freedom to define their own scope of safety 
management system. This research solves this problem by proposing ConSASS-
2D which is a two dimensional framework. 
 
For construction safety there’s no systematic methodology to guide the design, 
audit and development of individual system elements telling the intent and 
purpose of system elements. Open questions include: how to integrate safety 
standards avoiding duplicated effort during the development and implementation 
of the safety management system; how to reduce audit subjectivity; how to define 
a consistent level measurement scheme for individual system elements which can 
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provide comparable performance among system elements and how to organize 
audit questions and achieve audit questions through implementing safety 
practices were still open questions.  These issues will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
For construction safety, the interrelationship among safety elements and appraisal 
scheme characterizing the overall quality of the safety management system as a 
whole are still under research. These issues will be discussed in Chapter 5. The 
question of how to derive a development strategy based on the audit results has 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. The research 
methodology consists of a literature review, interviews with industry safety 
professionals, followed by the development of the ConSASS-2D framework and 
audit scheme, a demonstration of the application of ConSASS-2D with case 
studies and a comparison between ConSASS-2D and ConSASS. 
 
3.1 Problem Identification and Interview with Safety Professionals 
The first step was to review the construction safety management system 
standards in Singapore. The difficulties of designing a construction safety 
management system have been elaborated. In step 2, the characteristics and 
problems of a construction safety audit system (ConSASS), were analyzed 
systematically based on design philosophy, audit scheme and indication of audit 
results. In step 3, interviews were conducted with an approved safety auditor, a 
safety officer, and a senior manager to discuss the difficulties and problems of 
current construction safety management systems and ConSASS.  The results of 
these three steps suggested that, there is a need for a more flexible framework 
within which to undertake the systematic design, audit and development of 
construction safety management system for different sizes of projects.    
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3.2 Model Construction 
A two dimensional framework ConSASS-2D has been introduced with a capability 
dimension guiding the design and audit of individual process areas, and a maturity 
dimension characterizing the overall quality of a safety management system. This 
two dimensional model structure has been adapted from the architecture of CMMI 
which is a widely used model across industries.  
 
In step 4, the capability dimension of ConSASS-2D was elaborated. The four sub-
steps are further elaborated below.  
 
In step 4.1, a hierarchical process area structure was introduced. The definitions 
of goals satisfying process areas and practices supporting these goals have been 
adapted from CMMI. This is because CMMI defines a unified development 
methodology across seemingly disparate and different process areas. 
 
In step 4.2, three capability levels have been introduced, as per CMMI. This is 
because although different industries have different process areas, the levels 
characterizing the development status of multiple process areas can be quite 
similar. The audit philosophy of the different capability levels was elaborated 
based on the relationship between the process area components. 
 
In step 4.3, goals and supporting practices have been designed considering the 
characteristics of the construction industry. An essential process area for 
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construction safety management, Risk Management, has been selected as an 
example to elaborate the definitions and relationship of process area components. 
 
In step 4.4, a systematic standards integration methodology, resolving their 
differences and overlaps, has been elaborated using Code of Practice 79 and 
Singapore Standard 506 as the basis for the integration. Detailed descriptions of 
these steps are included in Chapter 4. The reason why there are three capability 
levels and how supporting generic practices have been selected will be discussed 
in detail after the concept of maturity levels has been elaborated. This is because 
with the overall view of ConSASS-2D in mind, it will be easier to understand how 
this two dimensional model has been organized and developed systematically.    
 
In step 5, maturity levels of ConSASS-2D were constructed.  
 
In step 5.1, Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 process areas of ConSASS-2D have been 
derived based on Singapore Standard 506. In order to bring continual 
improvement and system learning, new capabilities defined within Set 4 process 
areas of ConSASS-2D have been introduced based on similar concepts in CMMI. 
The application of two process areas has been elaborated considering the 
situation of the construction industry.   
 
In step 5.2, the underlying grouping philosophy of process areas has been 
discussed. In step 5.3, the definitions of maturity levels and how to achieve each 
maturity level have been elaborated. In step 5.4, a systematic discussion about 
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the overall design and organization of ConSASS2D is developed. Details of the 
procedures in these sub-steps are included in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3 Case Studies 
In step 6, in order to show the practical application of ConSASS-2D, two case 
studies have been conducted. More case studies can be conducted in the future 
with the support of governmental and private organizations. However, because of 
the limitation of time and support from the government and industry, only these 
two case studies have been conducted.  A large project, Project L, with contract 
sum above S$30m and a medium project, Project S, with contract sum above 
S$10m were chosen for the case studies.   
 
Project L had already gone through a ConSASS audit conducted by accredited 
safety auditors. The results and documentation from this audit were used to 
conduct another audit according to the ConSASS-2D framework. For the 
ConSASS-2D audit questions whose results cannot be derived from a ConSASS 
audit and for Project S which has not been audited against ConSASS, it was 
assumed that if there were detailed descriptions about certain safety practices 
with appropriate supporting documents or records, the safety practices have been 
performed effectively as described.  This is because the nature of this research 
study focuses on providing a conceptual framework, and a systematic and logical 
methodology for the design, audit and development of a safety management 
system. Experienced or approved safety auditors are better at judging whether 
certain safety practices have been performed by reviewing related documents, 
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conducting site inspection and interview with safety staff. Therefore, the audit of 
certain safety practices have not been elaborated in very detail. Recommended 
development strategies based on the ConSASS-2D audit results have been 
elaborated.  
 
3.4 A Comparison of ConSASS-2D with ConSASS 
In step 7, a comparison of ConSASS-2D and ConSASS has been conducted to 
determine the differences in the underlying design, audit and planning principles. 




In step 8, a brief summary of contributions of this research has been stated. In 
step 9, limitations of this research and recommendations of future research have 
been described in an overall and long term view.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE CAPABILITY DIMENSION OF 
CONSASS-2D 
 
This chapter elaborates on the capability dimension of ConSASS-2D which 
provides a systematic and logical methodology for the design and audit of 
individual process areas. This chapter also discusses the procedures to combine 
and rationalize the requirements from different safety standards. A harmonized 
example of a process area will be presented. In order to elaborate on the rationale 
and thinking behind the capability dimension, an example about risk management 
is used, based on the Workplace Safety and Health Code of Practice on Risk 
Management. Risk Management is selected for discussion because it is essential 
in the planning and implementation stages of construction safety management.  
 
4.1 The Structure of a Process Area  
ConSASS-2D comprises groups of process areas. A process area is a group of 
related practices that, when implemented collectively, satisfies a set of goals 
considered important for making improvements in that area (CMMI, 2010). The 
structure of a process area can be seen in Figure 4.1. Each process area 
possesses special functions and characteristics that differentiate it from other 
process areas. This relates to the specific goals of a process area. However, all 
the process areas also have generic goals to achieve, e.g., essential safety 
practices need to be maintained during times of stress. These specific and 
generic goals structure a process area, and guide the design of supporting 
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practices. These goals can be consistently measured and prioritized. Purpose 
statements and introductory notes can help users better understand the process 
area structured by goals and practices. The definition and relationship of these 













Figure 4.1 Components of a process area 
 
 
4.2 Specific Goals and Specific Practices 
Each ConSASS-2D process area has a unique role or function within the safety 
management system. Therefore, each process area could be thought of as being 
responsible for achieving particular desired outcomes with respect to safety 
management. Specific goals describe the unique characteristics of an area that 
must be present to satisfy the process area (CMMI, 2010). Taking the Risk 
Management process area as an example, two specific goals can be included: 
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Specific Goal 1 risk assessment and Specific Goal 2 mitigate risks. Taking the 
Training process area as another example, its specific goals can be Specific Goal 
1 identify training needs, and Specific Goal 2 provide training. These examples 
show that specific goals are different for different process areas because they 
fulfill different functions. Specific practices describe the activities that are expected 
to result in the achievement of the specific goals of a process area (CMMI, 2010). 
Taking Specific Goal 1 risk assessment from process area Risk Management as 
an example, the two supporting specific practices are Specific Practice 1.1 - 
‘Establish safe work procedures for all the work activities’ and Specific Practice 
1.2 - ‘Conduct risk assessment associated with all the work activities’. 
 
4.3 Capability Levels and Generic Goals 
Performing the specific practices that support specific goals means that these 
specific goals have been satisfied. However, this does not indicate that these 
specific practices will be carried out during a time of stress nor repeated in the 
future. Development of an individual process area along the capability dimension 
of ConSASS-2D characterized by capability levels will help ensure that the 
performance of specific activities can be maintained during times of stress and 
can be repeated in the future. 
 
There are three capability levels defined in ConSASS-2D, namely: Capability 
Level 1 - A Performed Process Area; Capability Level 2 - A Managed Process 
Area; and Capability Level 3 - A Defined Process Area (Figure 4.2). These 
capability level definitions are the same for all process areas. The development 
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status of an individual process area can therefore be measured by capability 
levels consistently across multiple process areas. A capability level is achieved 
when the associated generic goal is satisfied. A generic goal is called „generic‟, 
because the same goal statement can be used across all the process areas 
(CMMI, 2010).  
Generic Goal 1: 
Perform a process 
area
Capability Level 1
Specific goals are to be 
satisfied which means 
specific practices are to 
be performed. 
Provide an essential 
foundation to support the 
basic performance. 
Standardize the process 
area, then it can be used 
by multiple projects.  
Generic Goal 2: 
Manage a process 
area
Generic Goal 3: 






Figure 4.2 Capability levels and generic goals 
 
Capability Level 1 is achieved when Generic Goal 1 is satisfied by performing the 
specific practices of the process area, thereby satisfying the specific goals 
associated with these practices. Although achieving Capability Level 1 means 
basic tasks of a process area have been accomplished, achievements from these 
specific goals may be lost over time or during times of stress if the process area is 
not properly managed. The application of generic practices at Capability Level 2 
and Capability Level 3 helps ensure that this achievement is maintained.  
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Capability Level 2 is achieved when a process area is managed thus satisfying 
Generic Goal 2. A managed process area builds upon the achievements of a 
performed process area by creating the essential foundation for sustaining the 
activities in the process area. This foundation may include: (a) providing the 
necessary resources to manage this process area, e.g., capable people or 
adequate physical resources; (b) assigning responsibility and authority to perform 
this process area; and (c) monitoring and controlling the process area to ensure 
its compliance with legal requirements or adherence to defined procedures. The 
performance of generic practices in Capability Level 2 helps ensure that existing 
practices are retained during times of stress.  
 
Capability Level 3 is achieved when a process area can be standardized in such a 
way that essential generic features can be replicated across different 
implementations (within specific projects) thus satisfying Generic Goal 3. The 
description of a procedure at Capability Level 2 can differ between projects. 
Projects and organizations are encouraged to set more standardized procedures 
or descriptions for process areas but which can be customized to the needs of 
individual projects. Standardization, with project specific customization, offers the 
benefit of generalizing and transferring experience from completed projects to 
future projects. The performance of generic practices in Capability Level 3 helps 
ensure that success of process can be repeated in the future.   
 
Designing a good description of a process area requires a group of safety 
professionals or experts to analyze and break down the legal and other 
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requirements and published best practices based on their experience and 
professional knowledge in the construction industry. The analysis is necessary to 
generalize the goals of the process area and develop supporting and alternative 
effective practices to support the goals. Such descriptions or procedures of this 
process area should be regarded as the knowledge asset of the company which 
can be applied to design the process area description for multiple projects. Since 
the main body of these descriptions can be kept and reused, tremendous effort 
can be saved while designing the same process area for other projects. For 
different projects, the goals of the process area will be similar, but some 
supporting or alternative safety practices may need to be customized to the 
specific situation or characteristics of the project. For example, the monitoring 
steps may be the same, but the scope of monitoring may depend on the 
complexity and characteristics of the project.  
 
4.4 Generic Practices for Generic Goals 
Generic goals define the path of improvement in a process area, and generic 
practices support the attainment of these developmental goals. This generic goal 
and supporting generic practice structure reduces the dependency of success in a 
process area on the competence of the project persons involved. A generic goal 
can be used in appraisals to determine whether a capability level is satisfied. 
Generic practices (Table 4.1) characterize the criterion or cover the essential 
aspects to attain the three levels of generic goals. 
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Table 4.1 Generic goals and generic practices 
Generic Goal Generic Practices 
Generic Goal 1 
Perform a 
process area 
Generic Practice 1.1 Perform specific practices 
Generic Goal 2 
Manage a 
process area 
Generic Practice 2.1 Provide necessary resources for 
performing the process 
Generic Practice 2.2 Assign responsibility and authority for 
performing the process 
Generic Practice 2.3 Monitor and control the process against 
defined procedures or legal requirements and take appropriate 
corrective actions  
Generic Goal 3 
Define  a 
process area 
Generic Practice 3.1 Communicate and incorporate feedback for 
the process area  
Generic Practice 3.2 Review the process area 
 
A performed process area is achieved when its specific goals are satisfied, which 
means corresponding specific practices have been performed. Generic Practice 
1.1 is ‘Perform the specific practices of the process area’.  
 
A managed process area is a process area which possesses a mechanism to 
support and maintain its performance. This mechanism is organized around three 
aspects, namely resource, responsibility and authority, and monitoring and control 
expressed in three generic practices. Generic Goal 2 manage a process area is 
achieved when the supporting three generic practices have been performed. 
 
Generic Practice 2.1 is to provide the necessary resources to perform the process 
area. For a process area in construction safety, this usually includes providing 
capable people to perform this process area. This capability can be defined by 
knowledge or experience. If personnel are incapable of performing the required 
task, then related training needs to be conducted, or consultation with invited 
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professionals or experts is necessary.  Another type of resource required is 
physical resources, e.g., safety facilities or equipment. For example, in the Risk 
Management process area, Generic Practice 2.1 provide adequate resources to 
perform this process area has been further elaborated to include resources in two 
categories: Generic Practice 2.1.1 - ‘Form a competent risk management team’, 
and Generic Practice 2.1.2 - ‘Provide physical safety facilities or equipment like 
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) to implement the risk control measures’.  
 
Generic Practice 2.2 is to assign the responsibility and accountability for the 
performance of a process area. An example of responsibility and accountability 
assignment for process area Risk Management has been tabulated in Table 4.2. 
Four different roles are used: R (responsible), A (accountable), C (consulted) and 
I (informed). More than one party could be assigned to perform the task (held 
responsible) but it is recommended that only one party should be held 
accountable for the outcome of the task. A summary of the goals and practices 
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Table 4.2 Responsibility assignment for Risk Management  
 
GG1 SG1 Assess Risks SG2 Mitigate Risks 
 SP1.1 SP1.2 SP2.1 SP2.2 
Employer C C A C 
Manager A A R A 
RM/RA Leaders R R R C 
Employees I I I R 
GG2 GP2.1 Resources GP2.2 R&A GP2.3 Monitor & Control 
 GP2.1.1 GP2.1.2 GP2.2 GP2.3.1 GP2.3.2 
Employer A A A C C 
Manager R R R A A 
RM/RA Leaders C C C R C 
Employees I I I I R 
GG3 GP3.1 Communication GP3.2 Review 
 GP3.1.1 GP3.1.2 GP3.2.1 GP3.2.2 
Employer C C C C 
Manager A A A A 
RM/RA Leaders R R R R 
Employees I R I I 
 
Note:  
SG1   assess risks 
SP1.1      establish safe work procedures for all work activities 
SP1.2      conduct risk assessment associated with all the work activities 
SG2    mitigate risks 
SP2.1      develop and approve control measures 
SP2.2      implement controls 
GP2.1.1 form a risk management team 
GP2.1.2 provide PPE and other necessary safety equipment 
GP2.2     assign responsibility and authority 
GP2.3.1 comply with legal and other requirements  
GP2.3.2 monitor the effectiveness of the procedures  
GP3.1.1 gather information to communicate 
GP3.1.2 communicate gathered information 
GP3.2.1 regular updates monthly 
GP3.2.2 review the procedures when accidents and significant changes occur  
 
Generic Practice 2.3 is to monitor and control the effectiveness of a process area 
to ensure its compliance with legal requirements or adherence to defined 
procedures. If the performance of a process area deviates significantly from the 
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plan, then the effectiveness of the control measures should be reviewed. If 
necessary, new control measures should be instituted.  
 
For example, in the Risk Management process area, Generic Practice 2.3 has 
been further elaborated into two sub-practices including: Generic Practice 2.3.1- 
‘Ensure the procedures of the process area are prepared in accordance with the 
Workplace Safety and Health Code of Practice on Risk Management’ and Generic 
Practice 2.3.2 - ‘The planned procedures are to be monitored (e.g., by regular 
inspections or process audits) to ensure that risk control measures have been 
implemented and are functioning effectively’. 
 
Generic Goal 3 is to define a process area. A process area is defined when the 
procedures of this process area have been standardized and can be customized 
to the needs of other projects. In construction safety, two generic practices about 
communication and review could contribute significantly to the standardization of 
a process area. 
 
Generic Practice 3.1 is to communicate and incorporate feedback within the 
process area. Communication on the safety management of ongoing work, and 
the communication of useful information to affected parties can enhance safety 
awareness and performance. Moreover, feedback from all levels of the 
organization can be gathered to revise ineffective control measures and inefficient 
procedures, and suggest better practices or implementation. Communication 
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provides the means for continual improvement and to contribute to better 
practices and methods in the process area.  
 
As an example, in the Risk Management process area, two sub-practices of 
Generic Practice 3.1 are presented as follows: Generic Practice 3.1.1 - ‘Various 
forms and levels of communication throughout the risk management process are 
to be carried out including specific communication of the hazards identified and 
their controls to the persons performing the activity’ and Generic Practice 3.1.2 - 
‘Feedback from employees, clients, suppliers or other stakeholders should be 
considered to revise the procedures and control measures of the process area‟.  
 
One essential characteristic of a strong process area is that it can adapt to 
change and contingencies. Generic Practice 3.2 is introduced to review the 
continual suitability and appropriateness of defined procedures and regularly 
update them. Review is also required to be conducted when there are significant 
changes, accidents and other significant circumstances, after which it equips the 
process area with the ability and procedure to deal with those circumstances 
proactively.  
 
As an example, in the Risk Management process area, two sub-practices of 
Generic Practice 3.2 are elaborated: Generic Practice 3.2.1 - ‘Provide regular 
updates of the risk assessment done and risk control measures implemented to 
ensure they are suitable and appropriate’ and Generic Practice 3.2.2 - ‘If 
necessary, revise the risk assessment at least once in three years from risk 
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assessment approval date, or when there are: accidents, near misses, dangerous 
occurrence, significant changes in processes, facilities, work practices or 
procedures and other significant circumstances’. 
 
4.5 Purpose Statements and Introductory Notes 
Purpose statements and introductory notes are the informative components of 
ConSASS-2D. A purpose statement describes the purpose of a process area, e.g., 
the purpose of the Risk Management process area is stated as ‘To identify and 
manage existing, and potential hazards to eliminate or minimize the risk of 
incidents’. 
 
It is sometimes difficult to adequately describe the goal or practice using a single 
statement. Introductory notes can provide the information necessary to 
understand the goals and practices during design, implementation and audit of a 
process area. Taking the Risk Management process area as an example, in order 
to make Generic Practice 2.1.1 - ‘Form a competent risk management team’ 
better understood and make its audit more objective, the following introductory 
note is provided:  
 
-A competent person for this task is one who has attended a risk 
management course conducted by a Ministry of Manpower 
Approved Training Provider or equivalent presents sufficient 
demonstration of the fact.  
-If risk assessment experience or expertise is lacking, a 
Workplace Safety and Health Officer, Workplace Safety and 
Health Auditor or Approved Risk Consultant who is trained and 
has experience in conducting risk assessment should be engaged 
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to assist the risk management or risk assessment leader in the 
conduct of the risk assessment. 
 
Introductory notes can also function as a place to hold information relevant to the 
performance of the safety practices in the process area specific to a particular 
project. For example, the note on ‘Hazards created in the vicinity of the workplace 
that should be considered in the risk assessment procedure’ can serve as a 
general reminder to consider hazards (for worksites that are isolated from human 
traffic), but becomes a useful place to point to a list of specific hazards identified 
for a worksite located in a busy business district. Other types of useful information 
that could be included in the Introductory Notes are related process areas, and 
the title and location of documents and records to track the performance of a 
process area.   
 
4.6 Audit and Development Scheme of Individual Process Areas  
A process area is defined in terms of components which possess a logical 
structure with respect to each other. All process areas follow the same logical 
structure, making the development, understanding and auditing of process areas 
easier. This logical structure facilitates auditing because it makes clear which 
practices, when observed or evidenced by documentation, serve to satisfy which 
goals. Audit results will now show which goals have yet to be met either because 
there was no evidence of any supporting practice or the supporting practice was 
not up to standard / expectation.  
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Audited capability levels, telling the levels of effectiveness of the process areas, 
are comparable for all process areas. After the ConSASS-2D audit, organizations 
can clearly identify the weaker elements in terms of failed practices and / or 
inadequate efforts / resources. The development steps of progressing up through 
the capability levels cannot be skipped, because each capability level needs to 
build on the foundation of the previous capability level. Furthermore, the 
implementation of practices in a lower capability level always has priority over that 
in the next higher capability level. The use of capability levels enables a project to 
plan the progressive development of a process area along a clear path starting 
from specific practices to generic practices in capability level 2 and capability level 
3. This ‘goal-to-practice’ structure also enables the rational integration of ‘best 
practice’ without significant duplication and overlap. The best practices 
fundamental and essential in achieving the goal can be kept, updating or 
replacing previous practices.  
 
4.7 Integration of Standards 
4.7.1 Difficulties of Standards Integration 
Organizations pursuing safety excellence can adopt / integrate multiple safety 
standards from a variety of choices. In Singapore, the development of safety 
management systems for construction worksites is governed by both Code of 
Practice 79 and Singapore Standard 506. Although they cover similar concepts, 
the classification of the concepts and the descriptions of safety elements differ 
somewhat between the two systems. This makes the design of safety 
management systems very onerous. 
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Code of Practice 79 consists of 14 safety management elements, where each 
element provides specific guidelines on how construction firms should organize 
and manage their sites to ensure the safety of their personnel and the public. For 
example, the objective of the element „Hazard Analysis‟ (Figure 4.3) is stated as 
‘to eliminate or minimize the risk of incidents’. A guideline on how to go about 
doing hazard analysis has been provided and consists of (1) forming a team to 
perform the actual analysis; (2) adopting a hazard analysis method and executing 
it; (3) documenting the results of step 2; and (4) implementing the hazard control 
measures identified in step 2.  
 
Singapore Standard 506 provides organizations with the elements of an effective 
safety management system. The element titled ‘Hazard Identification, Risk 
Assessment and Determining Controls’ is taken for comparison (Figure 4.4). In 
the section on ‘General Procedure’, the steps to develop this element include 
hazard identification, risk assessment, and the determination of the necessary 
controls. Unlike Code of Practice 79 which specifies particular documents to be 
developed, Singapore Standard 506 only provides some key considerations for 
the development of this element. These considerations include routine and non-
routine activities, the activities of persons having access to the workplace and 
other aspects specified in the statements from c) to j) which, for brevity, have 
been omitted in Figure 4.4. Singapore Standard 506 also recognizes the 
importance of coping with change on the project, and advises that the procedures 
developed under this system element be reviewed again when changes occur. 
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The standard also requires that risk control measures be developed according to 
the commonly adopted hierarchy of risk management.  
Objective: The objective of hazard analysis is to identify and manage 
existing and potential hazards to eliminate or minimize the risk of incidents.
CP79 Hazard Analysis
General: The occupier shall establish procedures to identify and analyze 
all existing and potential hazards. The procedures shall include the 
development and implementation of hazard analysis plan.
Hazard analysis plan
The occupier shall establish a hazard analysis plan which shall include the 
following:
a) formation of hazard analysis team;
b) duty and responsibility of team members;
c) hazard analysis method;
d) hazard analysis report; and 
e) implementation of measures
Hazard analysis method
The hazard analysis method shall include the following:
a) identification and record of existing and potential hazards;
b) identification of persons exposed to the hazards;
c) analysis and assessment of the risk involved; and
d) elimination or prevention of the risk.
Hazard analysis report
The hazard analysis report shall include the following:
a) records of all existing and potential hazards;
b) findings of analysis and assessment; and
c) development and implementation of control measures
 
Figure 4.3 Hazard analysis of CP79 
 
  45 
The organization shall establish, implement and maintain a 
procedure(s) for the ongoing hazard identification, risk assessment, 
and determination of necessary controls.  
SS506 Planning for Hazard Identification, 
Risk Assessment and Determining Controls
The procedure(s) for hazard identification and risk assessment shall 
take into account: 
a) routine and non-routine activities; 
b) activities of all persons having access to workplace (including 
contractors and visitors);
c), d), e), f), g), h), i), j)
When determining controls, or considering changes to existing controls, 
consideration shall be given to reducing the risks according to the 
following hierarchy:
a) elimination; b) substitution; c) engineering controls; d) signage/
warnings and/or administrative controls; and e) personal protective 
equipment. 
The organization shall document and keep the results of identification 
of hazards, risk assessments and determined controls up-to-date.
For the management of change, the organization shall identify the OSH 
hazards and OSH risks associated with changes in the organization, 
the safety management system, or its activities, prior to the introduction 
of such changes. 
The organization shall ensure that the results of these assessments 
are considered when determining controls. 
The organization‟s methodology for hazard identification and risk 
assessment shall:
a) be defined with respect to its scope, nature and timing to ensure it is 
proactive rather than reactive; and
b) provide for the identification, prioritization and documentation of risks, 
and the application of controls, as appropriate. 
The organization shall ensure that the OSH risks and determined 
controls are taken into account when establishing, implementing and 
maintaining its OSH management system.
 
Figure 4.4 Risk management of SS506 
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From the description of the ‘risk and hazard’ element for Code of Practice 79 and 
Singapore Standard 506, it is realized that Code of Practice 79 is geared towards 
practice and measures at the operational level. On the other hand, Singapore 
Standard 506 not only provides guidance on procedures but also describes the 
qualities of the safety management system under this element. A systematic 
design methodology is needed to guide the integration of these requirements to 
avoid duplicated effort during the development and implementation of the safety 
management system. 
 
4.7.2 The Procedure for Integrating the Standards  
The organization shall 
establish, implement and 
maintain a procedure(s) for 
the ongoing hazard 
identification, risk 
assessment, and 
determination of necessary 
controls.  
SS506 Planning for Hazard Identification, 
Risk Assessment and Determining Controls
CP79 Hazard Analysis
The occupier shall establish 
procedures to identify and 
analyze all existing and 
potential hazards. The 
procedures shall include the 
development and 
implementation of hazard 
analysis plan.
Risk management
SG1 Identify hazards and assess risks SG2 Mitigate risks
 
Figure 4.5 Example of specific goals generated from CP79 and SS506 
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The use of specific goals to represent process areas enables basic requirements 
arising from different systems to be harmonized. For example, in the Risk 
Management element, two specific goals could be generated from both Code of 
Practice 79 and Singapore Standard 506 namely: Specific Goal 1 risk assessment 
and Specific Goal 2 mitigate risks. Figure 4.5 illustrates the goal structure of this 
process area.   
 
From Code of Practice 79, the specific practices which could be identified to 
support Specific Goal 1 are: (1) identify and record existing and potential hazards 
(see Figure 4.3) and (2) identify persons exposed to the hazards. From Singapore 
Standard 506, the specific practices which could be identified to support Specific 
Goal 1 are: ‘Establish, implement and maintain procedures for hazard 
identification and risk assessment, taking into account routine and non-routine 
activities, including activities of all persons having access to the workplace, and 
considering infrastructure, equipment and materials at the workplace’. Projects 
and organizations could choose or design their own procedures to implement 
these specific practices according to their own circumstances. Figure 4.6 shows 
how the specific practices identified from Code of Practice 79 and Singapore 
Standard 506 were integrated.  
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CP79 Hazard Analysis







c) analyze and 
assess the risk 
involved and
d) eliminate or 
prevent the risk.
SS506 Planning for Hazard Identification, 
Risk Assessment and Determining Controls
The procedure(s) for hazard identification and risk 
assessment shall take into account: 
a) routine and non-routine activities; 
b) activities of all persons having access to workplace;
f) infrastructure, equipment and materials at the 
workplace, whether provided by the organization or 
others;
Risk  management
SG1 Identify hazards and assess risks SG2 Mitigate risks
SP1.1 Establish, implement and maintain a 
procedure(s) for hazard identification, risk 
assessment taking into account routine and 
non-routine activities; 
SP1.2 Procedures for hazard identification 
and risk assessment need to involve activities 
of all persons having access to the 
workplace; 
SP1.3 Procedures for risk management shall 
take into account infrastructure, equipment 
and materials at the workplace.
SP2.1 Establish, 
implement and maintain a 
procedure(s) for 
necessary controls with 
the consideration given to 






When determining controls, consideration shall be 
given to reducing the risks according to the following 
hierarchy:
a) elimination; b) substitution; c) engineering controls; 
d) signage/warnings and/or administrative controls; 
and e) PPE. 
 
Figure 4.6 Example of specific practices generated from CP79 and SS506  
 
 
Following a similar procedure, the requirements relating to generic practices can 
be classified based on the descriptions of the generic practices in Capability Level 
2 and Capability Level 3. Figure 4.7 shows an example of the generic practices 
tailored from both standards.  All the generic practices shown have been taken 
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from one source or the other. However, the two generic practices (marked in bold 
letters) have not been mentioned in either source – Generic Practice 2.3 Monitor 
and Control and Generic Practice 3.2 Communicate. This illustrates the utility of 
the goal-practice organization adopted in ConSASS-2D. By checking a designed 
process area against the generic practices, missing aspects of the process area 
can be detected.  
CP79 Hazard Analysis
The occupier shall 
establish a hazard 
analysis plan which 
shall include the 
formation of 
hazard analysis 
team; duty and 
responsibility of 
team members; 
SS506 Planning for Hazard Identification, 
Risk Assessment and Determining Controls
The organization shall document and 
keep the results of identification of 
hazards, risk assessments and 
determined controls up-to-date.
Procedures for hazard identification 
and risk assessment shall take into 
account changes or proposed 
changes in the organization, its 
activities or materials; 
Risk management
SG1 & SG2
GP2.1 Form a hazard analysis team.
GP2.2 Assign duty and responsibility of team members.
GP2.3 Monitor and control this process area.
GG1
GG2
GP3.2.1 Keep procedures and results of this process area 
up-to-date.
GP3.2.2 Establish, implement and maintain procedures to 
deal with changes or proposed changes in the 
organization, its activities or materials.
GG3
GP3.1 Communicate and incorporate feedbacks for 
this process area. 
 
Figure 4.7 Example of generic practices in Capability Level 2 tailored from CP79 
and SS506  
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Figure 4.8 shows the integrated Risk Management process area. The remaining 
contents of both standards have been incorporated as information components 
(not shown in Figure 4.8).  
 
Risk management
SG1 Identify hazards and 
assess risks
SG2 Mitigate risks
GP2.1 Form a hazard analysis team.
GP2.2 Assign duty and responsibility of team members.
GP2.3 Monitor and control this process area.
GG1
GG2
GP3.2.1 Keep procedures and results of this process 
area up-to-date.
GP3.2.2 Establish, implement and maintain procedures to 
deal with changes or proposed changes in the 
organization, its activities or materials.
GG3
GP3.1 Communicate and incorporate feedbacks for 
this process area. 
SP1.1 Establish, implement and 
maintain a procedure(s) for hazard 
identification, risk assessment taking 
into account routine and non-routine 
activities; 
SP1.2 Procedures for hazard 
identification and risk assessment 
need to involve activities of all persons 
having access to the workplace; 
SP1.3 Procedures for risk management 
shall take into account infrastructure, 







with the consideration 
given to reduce the 







Figure 4.8 The integrated Risk Management process area of CP79 and SS506 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter elaborated on the capability dimension of ConSASS-2D. A 
hierarchical process area structure was introduced. The definitions of goals 
satisfying process areas and practices supporting goals have been explained.  
 
Three capability levels have been introduced characterizing the development 
status of individual process areas. The audit philosophy of capability levels was 
elaborated based on the relationship of process area components. 
Process area Risk Management has been selected as an example to elaborate 
the definitions and relationship of process area components. 
 
A systematic standards integration methodology, resolving differences and 
overlaps, has been elaborated taking Code of Practice 79 and Singapore 
Standard 506 as examples. The reasons for having three capability levels and 
how supporting generic practices have been designed will be discussed in detail 
after the elaboration of maturity levels.  
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CHAPTER 5 THE MATURITY DIMENSION OF CONSASS-2D  
 
This chapter elaborates on the maturity dimension of ConSASS-2D which 
improves a safety management system by addressing sequential sets of process 
areas. The overall qualities of safety management systems characterized by 
maturity levels will be discussed. Having introduced all the concepts of ConSASS-
2D, the systematic development methodology of ConSASS-2D will be elaborated 
on.  
 
5.1 Sequential Sets of Process Areas along the Maturity Dimension 
In order to elaborate on the rationale and thinking behind the maturity dimension, 
process areas of ConSASS-2D have been derived from the system elements of 
Singapore Standard 506 and CMMI. In Singapore Standard 506, system elements 
have been organized as one cycle of Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) (Table 5.1). The 
PDCA cycle was made famous by W. Edwards Deming (Tortorella, 1995), and 
has been widely used in management systems, e.g. the ISO series. However, 
there is no guidance on the allocation of priority among these 16 system elements. 
Guidance on the priority of system elements for implementation is necessary 
because when resources are limited, effort needs to be directed to the most 
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Table 5.1 System elements of SS506  
 
In contrast, the process areas of ConSASS-2D have been grouped into four sets 
(Set 1 to Set 4) taking into account their function, roles and contribution towards 
the overall qualities of the safety management system. 
 
5.1.1 The Core Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle of Process Areas in Set 1 
The process areas in Set 1 are characterized as core / fundamental process 
areas of a safety management system. In the sections that follow, the names of 
process areas are set in italics and taken to refer to the process areas themselves. 
This core set ensures that the safety management system has the basic working 
mechanisms to handle the fundamental safety concerns and issues on a worksite. 
In Set 1, a basic set of considerations about the PDCA of the safety management 
PDCA SS506 System Element 
OSH policy OSH policy 
Planning 
Hazard identification, risk assessment and determining 
controls 
Legal and other requirements 
Objectives and program(s) 
Implementation and 
operation 
Resources, roles, responsibility, accountability and 
authority 
Competence, training and awareness 
Communication, participation and consultation 
Documentation 
Control of documents 
Operational control 
Emergency preparedness and response 
Checking 
Performance measurement and monitoring 
Evaluation of compliance 
Incident investigation, nonconformity, corrective action 
and preventive action 
Control of records 
Internal audit 
Management review Management review 
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system has been identified (Figure 5.1). The Risk Management and Legal and 
Other Requirements Management process areas guide the planning of safe work 
procedures. Responsibility and Authority Management guides the doing of safe 
activities. Monitoring and Control guides the checking and acting of activities. 
However, things do not often go according to plan, especially on construction sites 





















Figure 5.1 Process areas in Set 1 
 
The choice of process areas to be included in the Set 1 is influenced by common 
sense reflected in the safety management system literature. Safety policy is the 
most influential factor driving safety performance in the construction industry 
(Sawacha et al., 1999). It sets the overall tone for a safety management system 
by demonstrating the organization‟s priority and commitment to safety, articulates 
its compliance to legal and other requirements, and clearly states the strategy of 
its safety management system (Heberle, 1998). 
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Plan: Risk management plays a vital role in safety management by making sure 
that hazards of all the work procedures for the project have been identified and 
the risks involved have been assessed with proper control measures developed 
and implemented (Zhi, 1995). Legislation forms the framework within which health 
and safety is regulated and controlled (Rowlinson, 1997). Ensuring compliance to 
legislation has to be taken seriously when planning job activities and setting up 
company policies.  
 
Do: Responsibility should be assigned for all the aspects of a safety management 
system, so that managers, supervisors, and employees in all parts of the 
organization know their tasks clearly and have the proper authority to perform the 
assigned responsibilities. In order to identify the main causes of accidents and the 
most effective means of intervention, several authors have considered the roles of 
designers (Hinze and Wiegand, 1992), construction managers (Gans, 1981), 
owners (Samelson and Levitt, 1982), safety supervisors (Hinze and Gordon, 
1979), foremen (Samelson, 1977), top management (Levitt and Parker, 1976), 
and middle management (Hinze, 1976). The responsibilities and roles that 
management takes on will determine the overall safety performance of the entire 
site (Mattila et al., 1994). The traditional assumption that safety is the sole 
responsibility of the contractor (Hinze and Wiegand, 1992) is no longer valid, 
especially after the introduction of the Construction, Design, and Management 
(CDM) regulations. The fundamental principle on which these regulations are 
based is that all project participants (client, architect, designers, subcontractors, 
etc.) who contribute to safety on a project are to be included in considering safety 
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issues systematically, stage by stage, from the outset of the project (Baxendale 
and Jones, 2000).  
 
Do and Check: Emergency Preparedness and Response addresses the aftermath 
of occupational accidents and incidents. The subsequent impact of incidents / 
accidents depends not only on their severity but can be reduced by the prompt 
rendering of first aid and emergency care (Fiske, 1999). Properly administered 
emergency and first aid management can bring about the difference between life 
and death, rapid versus prolonged recovery, and temporary versus permanent 
disability.  People trained in first aid have also expressed a greater willingness to 
take personal responsibility for safety and a willingness to adopt safe behavior 
(Lingard, 2002). Accident and Incident Management introduces a mechanism to 
ensure that there is timely investigation of accidents so that meaningful 
information from these investigations can be used effectively to reduce or 
eliminate foreseeable hazards (Hinze and Wilson, 2000). 
 
Check and Act: Work activities need to be monitored and controlled against 
defined procedures, or legal and other requirements, so that appropriate 
corrective actions can be taken when actual performance deviates inappropriately 
from the plan (CMMI, 2010).   
 
5.1.2 Organizational Plan-Do-Check-Act of Process Areas in Set 2 
The process areas in Set 2 are characterized as organizational process areas. 
The implementation of theses process areas brings about another round of the 
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PDCA cycle, augmenting the previous one (Figure 5.2). Objective and Program(s) 
guides the planning of safe work procedures. Training and Communication 
Management informs the doing of safe activities. Management Review guides the 
checking and acting of safe activities. The design and implementation of Set 2 
process areas will help the design and implementation of existing process areas.  
 
Objectives and program(s) management adds activities that lead to the 
establishment of safety objectives and programs to achieve these objectives. 
Training could give personnel the knowledge and skills necessary to achieve their 
expected performance. Communication helps bring valuable information into and 
continually improve the safety management system, e.g. inform affected 
personnel of the necessary information and get feedback to make the operation of 
the safety management system more efficient and effective. A review of the safety 
management system by management at regular planned intervals, in addition to 
those driven by events, helps ensure the continuing suitability, ability to deal with 
change, adequacy and effectiveness of the safety management system.  
 





























Figure 5.2 Process areas in Set 1 and Set 2 
 
The establishment of realistic but challenging objectives and the programs 
necessary to enable the organization to achieve these objectives is crucial to 
promoting the confidence of members of the organization that the activities that 
they are required to do lead to meaningful results, and enable them to evaluate 
their performance and progress towards achieving those goals. The Objectives 
and Program(s) Management helps identify meaningful objectives for the safety 
management system. For example, a project sets its safety objective as to get a 
safety certificate by satisfying the requirements of Singapore Standard 506. This 
objective needs to be broken down and detailed into the affected process areas.  
 
There are two specific goals for Training: identify training needs and provide 
training. Training programs equip firms with the appropriate knowledge and skill 
sets to carry out the activities required by their processes. For example, training 
  59 
can help the safety staff know how to design and implement a safety management 
system satisfying the requirements of Singapore Standard 506.  
 
Communication among the different construction trades and firms on a variety of 
project issues has always been a major concern in construction. Effective 
communication and information transfer among all levels of the organization from 
management to employees will yield better understanding and awareness of 
safety standards, provide timely feedback on the effectiveness of the control 
measures and the update of the revised control measures, and therefore enhance 
the achievement of safety policies and objectives (Holt, 2001). In Singapore, 
increasing the effectiveness of communication among supervisors and workers is 
even more important because many of its construction workers are from different 
countries and speak different languages (Ling et al., 2009). In those companies 
operating with subcontractors, the likelihood of a failure in the communication, 
coordination and control procedures will increase (Debrah and Ofori, 2001). 
 
Top management should undertake a regular review of the overall performance of 
the safety management system with regard to its suitability, adequacy and 
effectiveness. Management review and commitment is one way of positively 
involving stakeholders in the safety management process (Baxendale and Jones, 
2000). It is found that large construction companies generally have better safety 
performance due to the high level of safety support and commitment from top 
management (Hinze and Raboud, 1988). The reduction in accidents is achieved 
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when top management takes an active interest, and when it is dedicated to safety 
enhancement and maintaining good safety standards (Mattila et al., 1994).  
 
5.1.3 Quantitative Plan-Do-Check-Act of Process Areas in Set 3 
The process areas in Set 3 are characterized as quantitative process areas 
strengthening existing PDCA cycles (Figure 5.3). The safety management system 
could be audited with quantifiable measures and its performance measured and 
compared according to meaningful levels. The objective measures employed 
could be chosen according to the needs of the organization. Once data on both 
work safety and system performance is collected, it would be necessary to control 
the data records in preparation for further analysis. Based on a quantitative 
understanding of the current and expected performance of the safety 


































Figure 5.3 Quantitative process areas in Set 3 
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Audits can be used to review and evaluate the performance and effectiveness of a 
safety management system. Audit results can serve a qualitative purpose, e.g. to 
check whether the safety management system of a project has satisfied the 
requirements of Singapore Standard 506. Audit results can also be semi-
quantitative, e.g. a ConSASS-2D audit can derive quantitative levels for individual 
process areas. The definition of these levels is consistent; therefore, the audit 
results are comparable across all the process areas.  
 
Performance measurement develops and sustains a measurement capability so 
that safety management can be data-driven; it will also become possible to 
benchmark projects and compare them across organizations. Construction firms 
need a rational framework for safety performance in order to objectively gauge 
their effectiveness in accident prevention over time (Petersen, 1980). 
Performance measurements can also be used to track the extent and progress of 
task accomplishment across the safety management system.  
 
Document control provides the means to identify, store, protect, retrieve and 
dispose the documents produced. Projects and organizations need to document 
their safety management system and its implementation to facilitate tracking of 
performance and auditing.  
 
5.1.4 Optimizing Process Areas in Set 4 
The process areas in Set 4 are characterized as optimizing process areas. The 
implementation of theses process areas continually improves the existing safety 
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management system based on a quantitative understanding of existing measures 





































Figure 5.4 Optimizing process areas in Set 4 
 
Performance analysis is geared towards improving both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the safety activities or measures. Benchmarking is a widely-used 
method of performance analysis that compares the performance of a particular 
project or organization against standard levels of achievement of peers in order to 
identify areas for improvement. Furthermore, with the use of a rational framework 
(such as ConSASS-2D) to define process capability in different safety 
management aspects, it becomes possible for the government or industry to 
establish guidelines and standards based on the data collected. 
 
Performance Analysis can be conducted by identifying „issues‟ and analyzing the 
cost and benefit of measures to address the issue. These issues can be those 
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promoted by national safety campaigns or the company itself. For example, the 
Ministry of Manpower Singapore has indicated that they are in the midst of 
implementing programs to instill a safety culture in all industries, including 
construction (Ministry of Manpower, 2002). Safety culture is a term used to 
describe the way in which safety is managed in the workplace, and often reflects 
„the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that employees share in relation to 
safety‟ (Cox and Cox, 1991). Safety culture has been emphasized for a long time, 
but contractors themselves may not understand or comprehend the meaning of  
the term (Teo and Phang, 2005). One of the ways to investigate organizational 
safety culture is by conducting employee perception surveys to detect differences 
in their attitudes and to test the effectiveness of a safety program (O'Toole, 2002). 
Some organizations may lack the resources and knowledge required to carry out 
these surveys, and may focus only on the daily operational procedures. 
Therefore, performance analysis can help projects and organizations have an 
idea about the cost-effectiveness of the safety program.  
 
Some studies have shown that safety incentives do not improve safety 
performance as measured by safety indices (McAfee and Winn, 1989). Other 
studies report more favorable outcomes and claim that a reduction in construction 
site accidents and injuries can be achieved (Geller, 1999). A possible reason for 
these conflicting results might be that the effect induced by safety incentives is 
dependent upon the group relationships, expectations of individuals and reactions 
towards safety incentives (Hinze and Gambatese, 2003). Safety culture has been 
proposed as a necessary foundation without which incentives may be less 
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effective in influencing work behaviors (Champoux and Brun, 2003). Some cost-
benefit analysis of incorporating safety culture and safety incentives to certain 
worksites can be conducted through the implementation of the performance 
analysis process area. 
 
The Causal Analysis and Resolution process area aims to identify the root causes 
of safety problems and prevent their recurrence in the future. For example, the 
conflicts during the concurrent operation of a safety management system and 
quality management systems can be analyzed by this process area. In 
construction, the integration of the quality management system and the safety 
management system is of particular interest to progressive contractors ( arc  a et 
al., 2002).  
 
5.2 Maturity Levels of ConSASS-2D 
 It is not necessary to implement the full capability of each process area or even 
all the process areas for every project. Smaller projects will benefit from a safety 
management system of smaller scope which is still effective in addressing the key 
safety concerns and issues. Maturity levels are defined to guide the development 
and characterize the development stages of a safety management system. Each 
maturity level progresses a safety management system by addressing an 
additional set of process areas and the increasing sophistication of the process 
areas. Each maturity level has been defined along a progressive scale such that 
there is a clear progression in the quality of a safety management system as it 
develops from one level to the next.  
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Four maturity levels have been defined for ConSASS-2D and are designated by 
the numbers 1 through 4: 
1. A Fundamental safety management system, 
2. A Managed safety management system, 
3. A Quantitatively Managed safety management system,  
4. An Optimizing safety management system. 
Each maturity level is defined as a set of process areas with a particular level of 
capability (Figure 5.5).  
 
S/No. Process Areas 
Capability Level 
1 2 3 
1.1 OSH Policy    
1.2 Risk management    
1.3 Legal and other requirements Management    
1.4  Responsibility and authority management ML1   
1.5 Monitoring and control    
1.6 Emergency preparedness and response    
1.7 Accident and incident management    
2.1 Objectives and program(s) management    
2.2 Training  ML2  
2.3 Communication management    
2.4 Management review    
3.1 Audit    
3.2 Performance measurement   ML3 
3.3 Document control     
4.1 Performance analysis 
ML4 
  
4.2 Causal analysis and resolution   
 
Figure 5.5 Maturity levels of ConSASS-2D 
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5.2.1 Maturity Level 1: A Performed Safety Management System 
A safety management system at Maturity Level 1 is characterized as a 
fundamental safety management system, i.e. the safety management system has 
the core process areas performing at Capability Level 1 (Figure 5.5). At this level, 
the basic functions of a safety management system are available and the required 
practices are being implemented. The requirement that the set of basic process 
areas achieve Capability Level 1 in order to reach Maturity Level 1 is a pragmatic 
one. It means that basic practices have been implemented to satisfy the specific 
goals of each process area. This constitutes a basic operational safety 
management system. However, there is no assurance that this achievement can 
be sustained during times of stress. The development of the safety management 
system to Maturity Level 2 addresses this issue of sustainability.  
 
5.2.2 Maturity Level 2: A Managed Safety Management System 
A safety management system at Maturity Level 2 is characterized as a managed 
safety management system. A managed safety management system is a safety 
management system with processes that work well with each other to secure 
desired outcomes, and functions well during times of stress. To achieve this level, 
a new set of area components (Set 2) is added to help the implementation of 
process areas in Set 1. The new process area components in Set 2 are shown in 
a darker shade of grey in Figure 5.5. At Maturity Level 2, it is recommended that 
all the process areas covered in Sets 1 and Set 2 are developed up to Capability 
Level 2, which means that the practices of these process areas could be 
sustained even during times of stress.  
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5.2.3 Maturity Level 3: A Quantitatively Managed Safety Management 
System 
A safety management system at Maturity Level 3 is characterized as a 
quantitatively managed safety management system. Additional process 
components identified to achieve Maturity Level 3 enable a quantitative 
understanding of the performance of selected processes, help derive quantitative 
indicators for overall safety performance, and provide process performance data 
to quantitatively manage the organization‟s safety management system. Process 
areas defined under Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 are upgraded to Capability Level 3 
which means that the processes are well characterized, understood, and 
standardized in order to repeat the achieved improvement for other projects. 
Process areas in Set 3 are used to quantify standardized process areas (in Set 1 
and Set 2) using goals that have been more consistently defined so that the 
quantified performance is comparable across multiple projects.  
 
A critical distinction between Maturity Level 2 and Maturity Level 3 is the 
predictability of process performance. At Maturity Level 2, a safety management 
system is qualitatively predictable e.g., it satisfies the requirements of Singapore 
Standard 506. At Maturity Level 3, the performance of a process area can be 
assessed quantitatively with a certain degree of confidence. 
 
5.2.4 Maturity Level 4: An Optimizing Safety Management System 
A safety management system at Maturity Level 4 is characterized as an 
optimizing safety management system. At Maturity Level 4, an organization 
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continually improves its processes based on a quantitative understanding of its 
safety objectives and performance needs. Two process areas have been 
introduced at Maturity Level 4 to further develop a safety management system. To 
achieve this level of maturity, process areas defined in Set 1 to Set 3 should be 
upgraded to a standardized and quantitative management level.  
 
5.3 The Systematic Design Methodology of ConSASS-2D 
With all the concepts elaborated for ConSASS-2D, the development philosophy of 
this two dimensional framework can be discussed now.  
 
5.3.1 Process Areas Introduced for ConSASS-2D 
ConSASS-2D process areas in Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 have been evolved from 
Singapore Standard 506. The process areas have been divided into sets 
according to the definition of maturity levels. Optimizing process areas in Set 4 
have been introduced from CMMI. These two optimizing process areas have been 
elaborated considering the needs of the construction industry.  
 
5.3.2 Definitions of ConSASS-2D Maturity Levels 
CMMI defines four maturity levels: managed, defined, quantitatively managed and 
optimizing. Corresponding process areas have also been listed in Table 5.2. 
CMMI has some process areas similar to those in the construction industry (these 
have been bolded in the table). The partition of these process areas into different 
sets according to maturity level will be discussed in the next section. The process 
areas in CMMI not related to construction safety are not included in ConSASS-2D.  
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Table 5.2 Maturity levels and process areas of CMMI 
Maturity Levels 
of CMMI 
Process Areas of CMMI 
Managed 
Configuration Management  
Measurement and Analysis  
Process and Product Quality Assurance  
Requirements Management  
(Supplier) Agreement Management  
Work/project Monitoring and Control  
Work/project Planning  
Defined 
Decision analysis and resolution 
Integrated work/project management 
Organizational process definition  
Organizational process focus  
Organizational training  
Risk management  
Quantitatively 
managed 
Organizational process performance  
Quantitative work/project management 
Optimizing 
Causal analysis and resolution  
Organizational performance management 
 
ConSASS-2D defines Maturity Level 1 as a performed safety management 
system considering that small projects and organizations need a practical and 
easy start. Therefore, functional / core process areas for safety management, like 
Monitoring and Control, Risk management, and Requirements Management have 
been incorporated in Maturity Level 1. 
 
ConSASS-2D did not define a maturity level characterizing the safety 
management system as „a defined system‟. For the construction industry, „defined‟ 
is quite a new concept and its achievement criteria may need more discussion. 
ConSASS-2D has introduced Capability Level 3 to define or standardize a 
process area. But it may be difficult for the industry to accept the idea that the 
safety staff will define or standardize a safety management system. Although the 
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systematic methodology proposed by ConSASS-2D helps bring about a standard 
way of design, audit and development of a safety management system, in order to 
make ConSASS-2D clear and easy to understand, „defined‟ has been assigned 
only to characterize the development status of individual process areas.  
 
Therefore, the development strategy recommended by ConSASS-2D is: 
1) design and implement a core / functional safety management system which 
means process areas in Set 1 need to achieve Capability Level 1; 
2) in order to ensure that this achievement can be maintained during times of 
stress, process areas in Set 1 need to be further developed into Capability 
Level 2; 
3) the next step is to quantitatively manage the safety management system, 
after the existing process areas have been standardized (developed into 
Capability Level 3, otherwise quantified performance of process areas may 
not be comparable among projects). When quantitative process areas in 
Set 3 are developed, safety management can be data driven and 
performance of process areas and the system are comparable across 
projects; 
4) if the projects and organizations would like to further improve the safety 
management system, optimizing process areas in Set 4 can be developed. 
Cost-effectiveness of advanced safety program can be analyzed and root 
cause of safety issues can be discussed.  
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5.3.3 Organization of Process Areas and Generic Practices 
Generic goals and corresponding generic practices of CMMI have been listed in 
Table 5.3. The generic practices appropriate for construction safety have been 
bolded in the table. The design and organization of these generic practices for 
ConSASS-2D will be discussed in this section.  
 
Table 5.3 Generic practices of CMMI 
Generic Goal  Generic Practices of CMMI 
Generic Goal 1 
Achieve 
Specific Goals 
Generic Practice 1.1 Perform specific practices 
Generic Goal 2 
Manage a 
process area 
Generic Practice 2.1 Establish and maintain an organizational 
policy for planning and performing the process. 
Generic Practice 2.2 Establish and maintain the plan for 
performing the process. 
Generic Practice 2.3 Provide adequate resources for 
performing the process, developing the work products, and 
providing the services of the process. 
Generic Practice 2.4 Assign responsibility and authority for 
performing the process, developing the work products, and 
providing the services of the process. 
Generic Practice 2.5 Train the people performing or supporting 
the process as needed. 
Generic Practice 2.6 Place selected work products of the 
process under appropriate levels of control. 
Generic Practice 2.7 Identify and involve the relevant 
stakeholders of the process as planned. 
Generic Practice 2.8 Monitor and control the process against 
the plan for performing the process and take appropriate 
corrective action. 
Generic Practice 2.9 Objectively evaluate adherence of the 
process and selected work products against the process 
description, standards, and procedures, and address 
noncompliance. 
Generic Practice 2.10 Review the activities, status, and results 
of the process with higher level management and resolve issues. 
Generic Goal 3 
Define  a 
process area 
Generic Practice 3.1 Establish a Defined Process Establish and 
maintain the description of a defined process. 
Generic Practice 3.2 Collect process related experiences 
derived from planning and performing the process to support the 
future use and improvement of the organization‟s processes. 
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In Capability Level 2 of CMMI, Generic Practice 2.1 is about policy. In the 
construction industry, a safety aspect can be defined as a generic aspect if it can 
be used by all the process areas. Safety policy defines the overall safety 
atmosphere and strategy of safety management, but it may not define the 
development of every process area in the safety management system. Therefore, 
safety policy has been defined as a process area, rather than a generic practice 
for ConSASS-2D.  
 
In Capability Level 2 of CMMI, Generic Practice 2.5 is about training. Considering 
the development status / situation of construction industry, staff performing 
specific jobs, e.g., that of a crane operator, needs certification before they are 
allowed to perform the work. Moreover, not every process area needs training. 
Therefore, training for individual process areas has been categorized in Generic 
Practice 2.1.1 Provide capable human resource to perform this process area. If 
capable human resource is not available, training or consultation may be 
conducted. Generic Practice 2.3, 2.4 and 2.8 of CMMI have been kept in 
ConSASS-2D. In order to maintain a simple and clear capability level structure, 
other generic practices in CMMI Capability Level 2 are encouraged but not 
required to achieve ConSAS-2D Capability Level 2.  
 
In Capability Level 3 of CMMI, if the two generic practices define a process area 
and collect related experience are used for the construction industry, it will be 
difficult to tell whether these two generic practices have been performed. 
Therefore, for ConSASS-2D, two generic practices, communication and review, 
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which have been defined in more detail and are more widely used in construction 
safety, have been specified as required to achieve Capability Level 3.  
 
Previously in CMMI, there are five capability levels with Capability Level 4 
quantitatively managed and Capability Level 5 optimizing. However, this is 
considered repetitive with Maturity Level 4 and Maturity Level 5. Therefore, 
currently, only three capability levels were kept. Therefore, it can be seen that in 
the development of ConSASS-2D, the foundational concepts and organizing ideas 
have been emulated but not strictly followed. This is because the needs of the 
construction industry at its current stage of development are very different from 
the software engineering and product manufacturing contexts which inspired 
CMMI. 
  
5.3.4 Development Priority of Process Areas and Generic Practices 
The design and implementation of some process areas can form the basis, and 
therefore aid the design and implementation of some generic practices (Table 5.4). 
For example, Communication Management is related to Generic Practice 3.1 
Communicate and incorporate feedback in individual process areas. This process 
area aims to set up a communication mechanism for the safety management 
system to organize related activities and provide the procedures and means of 
communication. This process area is more concerned with communication 
between different parties on the project. Generic Practice 3.1 is more concerned 
with the communication of specific aspects of an individual process area. If a 
process area is developed first, then with a well thought out communication 
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mechanism, it will be easier to develop and implement the related practice for 
individual process areas. Hence, this process area is implemented at Maturity 
Level 1 before the implementation of the related generic practice Generic Practice 
3.1 at Maturity Level 3. In ConSASS-2D, process areas have priority in 
implementation over related generic practices.   
Table 5.4 Priority of process area over generic practice 
ConSASS-2D Process Area ML Generic Practice ML 
1.4 Responsibility and authority 
management 
1 
GP2.2 Assign responsibility and 
authority 
2 
1.5 Monitoring and control 1 GP2.3 Monitor and control 2 
2.3 Communication management 2 GP3.1 Communicate 3 
2.4 Management Review 2 GP3.2 Review 3 
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter elaborated on the maturity levels of ConSASS-2D. Four sets of 
process areas have been introduced, and the underlying rationale for their 
grouping as process areas has been discussed. The definitions of maturity levels 
and how to achieve each maturity level have been elaborated. A discussion about 
the overall design and organization of ConSASS2D has been included.   
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a systematic view of the practical 
ConSASS-2D application. One large project with contract sum above S$30 million 
and the other project with contract sum above S$10 million have been discussed 
about the audit and development of construction safety management system.  
 
6.1 The Background of Selected Projects  
Project L is a large project undertaken by a large construction company (Building 
& Construction Authority, 1998). The company is a leading Singapore contractor 
registered with Building & Construction Authority under the highest financial grade 
for both Civil Engineering and General Building Construction. It was established in 
1959, and over the years, the company has developed its core competencies and 
acquired valuable expertise and experience in its field and successfully completed 
a wide range of projects including hotels, mixed developments, residential, 
institutional, industrial, landed housings, deep tunnel sewerage systems, road 
works and flyovers in Singapore and the Asia Pacific. The company is ISO 9000, 
ISO 14000 and ISO 18000 accredited and has achieved excellent safety records 
for its commitment towards Occupational Health and Safety Management in its 
Parc Emily project since the project start in February 2005.  
 
The Parc Emily project was awarded the prestigious UK Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA) Award in year 2005, Building & Construction 
Authority’s Construction 21 Best Practice Award and PUB’s Friends of Water 
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Award in year 2006 for its excellent environmental awareness and effort in waste 
water recycling for construction usage and effective silt management. On top of 
this, the project was conferred the Silver Award in the Innovation for Occupational 
Safety and Health Awards 2006 organized by the Ministry of Manpower for 
rewarding worthy contractors who have achieved commendable innovative work 
approaches towards Safety solutions (Workplace Safety and Health Awards 2006 
Winners, 2006).  
 
Project L is composed of 2 blocks of 24-storey, and 1 block of 25 storey 
residential building with a total of 352 units. It also includes 2 communal blocks 
comprising of swimming pool and communal facilities to existing Kent Vale Staff 
Housing at Clementi Road. It has achieved two million worker hours without any 
reportable accidents.   
 
Project S is a medium-sized project with a contract sum of S$23 million, 
undertaken by a medium-sized construction company (Building & Construction 
Authority, 1998). The company is registered with the Building & Construction 
Authority under the medium financial grade for Civil Engineering Construction and 
low financial grade for General Building Construction. It was established in 1984 
and was ISO 9001, OHSAS 18001 accredited. The project is about laying  
1200mm diameter NEWater Pipeline from Ulu Pandan NEWater Factory to Ayer 
Rajah Expressway.  
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6.2 The ConSASS-2D Audit of Project L 
Project L had already gone through a ConSASS audit conducted by accredited 
safety auditors. The results and documentation from this audit were used to 
conduct another audit according to the ConSASS-2D framework. For the purpose 
of illustration, the Risk Management process area is presented. Table 6.1 shows 
the ConSASS audit result for Risk Management, while Table 6.2 shows the 
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Table 6.1 The ConSASS audit result of Risk Management for Project L 
CL 2D Audit Question Results 
 PA1.2 
Planning for hazard identification, risk assessment and risk 
control (Are the following procedures developed and 
implemented? Or have the requirements been met?) 
 
 SG1 Risk Assessment  
1 SP1.1 Identify areas for risk assessment.  Yes 
1 SP1.2 Hazard identification for identified areas.  Yes 
1 SP1.3 
Assess risks of hazards identified.  Yes 
Procedures for risk assessment are proactive, not reactive.  Yes 
Procedures for risk assessment provide for the classification of 
risks and identification of those that are eliminated or controlled 
by measures.  
Yes 
 SG2 Mitigate Risks  
1 SP2 
Identify and implement control measures for the control of 
hazards identified.  
Yes 
Are the control measures selected appropriate?  Yes 
Are control measures selected based on the concept of hierarchy 
of controls (elimination, engineering control, administrative 
control, then PPE)?  
Yes 
2 GP2.1 
Are the risk assessments conducted by personnel that have 
adequate knowledge of the activities involved and the risk 
assessment technique adopted?  
Yes 
Are employees, supervisors and managers who are familiar with 
the new process, solicited for input on OSH design 
considerations?  
Yes 
Are qualified OSH professionals involved in the verification of the 
appropriateness and adequacy of design prior to operations?  
Yes 
Procedures for risk assessment provide input into the 
determination of: Facility requirements; identification of training 
needs and/or development of operational controls. 
Yes 
2 GP2.2 
Do job descriptions of personnel with OSH responsibilities make 
reference to the relevant risk assessment?  
Yes 
Are there clear guidelines as to who needs to be involved in the 
risk assessment process?  
Yes 
2 GP2.3 
Procedures for risk assessment provide the monitoring of 
required actions to ensure both the effectiveness and timeliness 
of their implementation.  
Yes 
Are there procedures to evaluate and ensure continual 
effectiveness of risk controls?  
Yes 
Are the variables that may limit the effectiveness of risk controls 
clearly identified in the risk assessments?  
No 
3 GP3.2 
Review risk assessment procedure to ensure its suitability.  Yes 
Was a baseline risk assessment conducted at an early state of 
the OSH management system development process or when 
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Table 6.2 The ConSASS-2D audit result of Risk Management for Project L 
CL 2D Audit Question Result 
 PA1.2 
Risk management 
(Are the following procedures developed and 
implemented? Or have the requirements been met?) 
 
 SG1 Risk Assessment  
1 SP1.1 








Is risk assessment conducted for the hazards 
identified? 
Yes 
 SG2 Mitigate Risks  
1 SP2 
Are control measures identified and implemented for 
the controls of hazards identified? 
Yes 
2 GP2.1.1 Is there a qualified risk management team? Yes 
2 GP2.1.2 
Are physical safety facilities or equipment like 
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) provided to 
implement the risk control measures? 
Yes 
2 GP2.2 
Are the responsibility and authority assigned for the 
risk management process and other people involved 




Are the procedures for risk assessment and control 
measures against defined procedures or legal and 
other requirements monitored?  
Yes 
GP2.3.2 
Are the procedures for risk assessment and control 




Are various forms and levels of communication taken 
place through the risk management process including 
specific communication of the hazards identified and 
their controls to the persons performing the activity?  
Yes 
GP3.1.2 
Is Feedback from employees, clients, suppliers or 
other stakeholders considered to revise the 





Are regular updates and review of the risk 
assessment and risk control measures provided to 
ensure they are suitable and appropriate?  
Yes 
GP3.2.2 
Is there additional review and revision to the 
procedures provided when there are accidents, near 
misses or significant changes in processes, facilities, 
work practices or procedures? 
Yes 
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The three questions marked in italics were included in the ConSASS-2D audit 
checklist and are not present in ConSASS. 
 
Generic Practice 3.1 communication requires evaluating evidence from the safety 
manual of Project L. In that document, the Risk management aspects of Project L 
were described in the following sections: purpose, responsibilities, description, 
communication, compliance and feedback, review, records, appendix and related 
documents. Most of these titles are self-explanatory, and give an idea of the 
specific requirements in each section. Some notes from Project L about 
communication are listed below:   
a) Project and corporate safety meetings are conducted weekly or when there 
are issues to discuss. 
b) Company personnel, subcontractors, supervisory personnel and 
employees should communicate with each other by meetings, notice 
boards, and in-house training. 
c) Employees should comply with risk control measures and safe work 
procedures. 
d) Employees shall provide feedback to their supervisors if there is any 
shortcoming on control measures. 
e) The company and subcontractor supervisory personnel shall update or 
communicate the reviewed hazard risk control measures to employees by 
the previously stated procedures. 
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There were also records of the meetings and the issues discussed; although an 
interview was not conducted because of the availability of related safety staff, it 
was assumed that the defined procedures are appropriate and effective and 
related safety activities have been performed as described.  
 
Generic Practice 2.1.2 is required in the Workplace Safety and Health Code of 
Practice on Risk Management but overlooked by the ConSASS Audit Checklist. 
However, Project L passes the audit question for Generic Practice 2.1.2 because 
the practice is clearly described in its safety manual with records attached. 
 
The results of the ConSASS-2D audit for the Risk Management are shown in 
Table 6.2. The project safety management system has passed all of the audit 
questions based on findings generated by the earlier ConSASS audit. System 
elements of Project L possess a very clear structure. Audited aspects can be 
checked against the procedures under the corresponding titles. The documents 
and records can be tracked according to the index provided under the title 
‘records’.  
 
6.3 The ConSASS-2D Audit of Project S 
Table 6.3 shows the ConSASS-2D audit result of Project S. Risk Management 
under Project S consists of merely listing and describing specific requirements for 
risk assessment, developing and implementing control measures. The 
documentation lacks a clear structure with descriptive titles.  
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Project S has developed safe work procedures for all its work activities. It also has 
a set of assessment forms from which it can be surmised that: (a) hazards have 
been categorized with the corresponding risks classified and evaluated, (b) 
existing control measures have been described, (c) additional control measures 
have been developed, (d) remaining risks have been evaluated. Many safety 
related documents of Project S were developed following the requirements of 
Code of Practice 79. Therefore, it was assumed that the Specific Practices for this 
process area have been implemented.  
 
There is a safety committee in Project S, as seen from its project organization 
chart (not reproduced here). Since there was no evidence that qualified personnel 
have been assigned to conduct risk assessment, Generic Practice 2.1.1 has been 
marked as failed. However, the safety management system audit question on 
Generic Practice 2.2 has passed, since responsibility and authority has been 
assigned for the Risk Management process. The procedures for risk assessment 
and control measures have been developed to comply with legal requirements 
(Generic Practice 2.3.1 was satisfied). Less attention has been paid to the 
effectiveness of these control measures,  and there was no evidence showing that 
the effectiveness of the procedures has been monitored and recorded (Generic 
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Table 6.3 The ConSASS-2D audit result of Risk Management for Project S   
CL 2D Audit Question Result 
 PA1.2 
Risk management 
(Are the following procedures developed and 
implemented? Or have the requirements been met?) 
 
 SG1 Risk Assessment  
1 SP1.1 








Is risk assessment conducted for the hazards 
identified? 
Yes 
 SG2 Mitigate Risks  
1 SP2 
Are control measures identified and implemented for 
the controls of hazards identified? 
Yes 
2 GP2.1.1 Is there a qualified risk management team? No 
2 GP2.1.2 
Are physical safety facilities or equipment like 
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) provided to 
implement the risk control measures? 
Yes 
2 GP2.2 
Are responsibility and authority assigned for the risk 
management process and other people involved in 




Are the procedures for risk assessment and control 
measures against defined procedures or legal and 
other requirements monitored?  
Yes 
GP2.3.2 
Are the procedures for risk assessment and control 




Do various forms and levels of communication take 
place through the risk management process including 
specific communication of the hazards identified and 
their controls to the persons performing the activity?  
No 
GP3.1.2 
Is feedback from employees, clients, suppliers or 
other stakeholders considered to revise the 





Are regular updates and review of the risk 
assessment and risk control measures provided to 
ensure they are suitable and appropriate?  
Yes 
GP3.2.2 
Is there additional review and revision to the 
procedures provided when there are accidents, near 
misses or significant changes in processes, facilities, 
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The safety documentation for Project S stated that safety meetings and tool box 
meetings are conducted, but communication and feedback procedures have not 
been developed specifically for this process area; as a result, Generic Practice 3.1 
has failed. There was evidence of a regular review of safety measures and the 
raising of significant issues, therefore, Generic Practice 3.2 has passed.   
 
6.4 The ConSASS-2D Audit Results by Practice  
Having presented the audit for the Risk Management process area, the results for 
the other process areas are now presented without further elaboration. Figure 6.1 
tabulates the ConSASS-2D audited results for Project S by practice. Specific 
Practices have been aggregated into one column because different process areas 
may have a different number of Specific Practices. For the Risk Management 
process area of Project S, Generic Goal 1 has been satisfied and marked in light 
gray to indicate a pass since all its Specific Practices have been performed. 
Generic Practice 2.1 has failed. Generic Practice 2.2 has passed and has been 
marked in a darker shade of gray to indicate that this cell belongs to a Maturity 
Level 2 profile. There are two practices in Generic Practice 2.3. Generic Practice 
2.3.1 monitoring against a defined procedure or legal requirements has passed, 
but Generic Practice 2.3.2 monitoring the effectiveness of procedures has failed. 
This leads to the failure of Generic Practice 2.3, therefore the corresponding cell 
has been left blank. The text entries in the cell indicate the practice that has not 
passed, as well as the fraction of entries that have passed. Generic Practice 3.1 
has failed and is also left blank. Generic Practice 3.2 passes and is marked in 
dark gray because this cell belongs to a Maturity Level 3 profile.  
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The audit result for other process areas by practice has been generated in a 
similar way. The cells of Figure 6.1 have been demarcated by dashed lines to 
show the profile of Maturity Levels, and shaded cells designate a pass. A maturity 
profile with all shaded cells means a Maturity Level is satisfied. Project S is at 
Maturity Level 1, which means core process areas have been performed and this 
constitutes a basic operational safety management system. However, if the 
performance of existing practices is to be maintained during times of stress, the 
core process areas in the current safety management system implementation 
should be upgraded to Capability Level 2. Alternatively, new practices can be 
implemented (possibly involving practices in new process areas) to achieve a 
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Process Area GG1 GG2 GG3 
SPs GP2.1 GP2.2 GP2.3 GP3.1 GP3.2 





1.2 Risk management    1/2 
GP2.3.2 
  
1.3 Legal and other 
requirements management 
      
1.4 Responsibility and authority 
management 
     1/2 
GP3.2.2 
1.5 Monitoring and control       
1.6 Emergency preparedness 
and response 
      
1.7 Accident and incident 
management 






2.1 Objectives and program(s) 
management 
      
2.2 Training       
2.3 Consultation management       
2.4 Management review       
3.1 Audit       
3.2 Performance measurement       
3.3 Document control 2/3 
SP1.3 
     
4.1 Performance analysis       
4.2 Causal analysis and 
resolution 
      
 
 
 Failed practice                Passed practice at ML1 
    
 Passed practice at ML2  Passed practice at ML3 
 
          ML boundary 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The ConSASS-2D audit results of Project S by practice 
 
If the Generic Practices about responsibility and authority assignment have been 
developed via a RACI matrix as shown in Table 5.11, then it is possible to identify 
who should be held accountable / responsible for the failure of the implementation 
of the practices that did not pass.  
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Table 6.4 Responsibility assignment matrix for Risk Management 
GG1 SG1 SG2 
 SP1.1 SP1.2 SP1.3 SP2 
Employer C C C C 
Manager A A A A 
RM/RA Leaders R R R R 
Employees I I I R 
GG2 GP2.1 GP2.2 GP2.3 
   GP2.3.1 GP2.3.2 
Employer A A C C 
Manager R R A A 
RM/RA Leaders C C R C 
Employees I I I R 
GG3 GP3.1 GP3.2 
 GP3.1.1 GP3.1.2 GP3.2.1 GP3.2.2 
Employer C C C C 
Manager A A A A 
RM/RA Leaders R R R R 
Employees I R I I 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the ConSASS-2D audit result of Project L by practice. As stated 
previously, Project L is undertaken by a company which possesses strong 
financial capability and a good safety reputation. These characteristics are 
reflected in the audit results which show that the safety management system for 
Project L has a higher Maturity Level, and even at this higher level of development, 
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Process Area GG1 GG2 GG3 
SPs GP2.1 GP2.2 GP2.3 GP3.1 GP3.2 
1.1 OSH policy       
1.2 Risk management       
1.3 Legal and other requirements 
management 
      
1.4 Responsibility and authority 
management 
      
1.5 Monitoring and control       
1.6 Emergency preparedness and 
response 
      
1.7 Accident and incident 
management 
      
2.1 Objectives and program(s) 
management 
      
2.2 Training       
2.3 Communication management       
2.4 Management review       
3.1 Audit       
3.2 Performance measurement       
3.3 Document control       
4.1 Performance analysis       
4.2 Causal analysis and resolution       
 
 Failed practice                Passed practice at ML1 
    
 Passed practice at ML2  Passed practice at ML3 
 
          ML boundary 
 
Figure 6.2 The ConSASS-2D audit results of Project L by practice 
 
 
There are no fraction entries appearing in the cells of the audit result of Project L. 
This is because no ‘inadequate’ or ‘partially implemented’ practice has been found. 
Project L has tried to develop its safety management system as comprehensively 
as they can. If a particular practice is chosen to be developed, there is hardly any 
sub-practice left unimplemented. On the other hand for those practices they 
overlook, there is barely anything implemented at all. ConSASS-2D can serve to 
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provide an organized format to consistently guide and check the development of 
individual process areas so that specific practices are not missed. 
 
6.5 The ConSASS-2D Score Card  
Figure 6.3 shows the ConSASS-2D audit results by Capability Levels for Project L. 
The numbers in the cells of the ConSASS-2D score card are the fraction 
(percentage) of practices implemented as assessed by the audit questions in that 
level. Maturity Levels have been marked out on the figure by different shades of 
gray. The cells demarcated by Maturity Level 2 dashed lines have all been 
marked as gray which means they all passed the ConSASS-2D audit. Therefore 
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S/No. Process Areas 
Capability Level 
1 2 3 
1.1 OSH Policy    
1.2 Risk management    
1.3 Legal and other requirements Management   1/2 
1.4  Responsibility and authority management    
1.5 Monitoring and control    
1.6 Emergency preparedness and response    
1.7 Accident and incident management   1/2 
2.1 Objectives and program(s) management    
2.2 Training   1/2 
2.3 Communication management     
2.4 Management review   1/2 
3.1 Audit   1/2 
3.2 Performance measurement  1/3 1 
3.3 Document control    
4.1 Performance analysis    
4.2 Causal analysis and resolution    
 
 
 Unimplemented CL               Implemented CL at ML1 
    
 Implemented CL at ML2  Implemented CL at ML3 
    
 ML boundary  Partially implemented CL / 
                                                                        With unsatisfied previous CL   
Figure 6.3 The ConSASS-2D audit results of Project L by capability levels  
 
Under ConSASS-2D, with the audit results presented above, it is easy to judge 
the stage of development of a safety management system and to identify the 
practices required to reach the next level of maturity. 
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From Figure 6.4, it is seen that the safety management system of Project S is at 
Maturity Level 1 as judged by the successive maturity stages marked by the 
dashed lines.  
S/No. Process Areas 
Capability 
Level 
1 2 3 
1.1 OSH Policy   1/2 
1.2 Risk management  1/3 1/2 
1.3 Legal and other requirements management    
1.4  Responsibility and authority management  2/3 1/2 
1.5 Monitoring and control    
1.6 Emergency preparedness and response  2/3  
1.7 Accident and incident management  1/3  
2.1 Objectives and program(s) management    
2.2 Training    
2.3 Communication management   2/3  
2.4 Management review    
3.1 Audit    
3.2 Performance measurement    
3.3 Document control 2/3   
4.1 Performance analysis    
4.2 Causal analysis and resolution    
 
 Unimplemented CL               Implemented CL at ML1 
    
 Implemented CL at ML2  Implemented CL at ML3 
    
 ML boundary  Partially implemented CL / 
                                                                              With unsatisfied previous CL   
 
Figure 6.4 The ConSASS-2D audits results of Project S by capability levels  
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6.6 Development Strategies 
Figure 6.5 shows the ConSASS-2D audit results of Project S by practice. It clearly 
indicates which practices have not passed the audit. Project S is at Maturity 
Level1 with all core process areas implemented at Capability Level 1 judged by 
the successive maturity stages marked by the dashed lines. 
 
Process Area GG1 GG2 
SPs GP2.1 GP2.2 GP2.3 
1.1 OSH policy 
 
TP2 TP2 TP2 
1.2 Risk management TP2  TP2 
1.3 Legal and other requirements management TP2 TP2 TP2 
1.4 Responsibility and authority management TP2   
1.5 Monitoring and control    
1.6 Emergency preparedness and response   TP2 
1.7 Accident and incident management TP2  TP2 
2.1 Objectives and program(s) management TP3 TP3 TP3 TP3 
2.2 Training     
2.3 Communication management    TP3 
2.4 Management review TP3 TP3 TP3 TP3 
 
 Failed practice                Passed practice at ML1 
    
 Passed practice at ML2  Target Profile  boundary  
           
Figure 6.5 The development strategy for Project S 
 
In ConSASS-2D, specific practices of core / functional process areas deserve top 
development priority and therefore they constitute Target Profile 1. For Project S, 
since all the practices in Target Profile 1 have been achieved, the whole profile 
has been marked as gray. Thus the next objective is to manage the existing 
process areas in Set 1 to ensure their performance can be maintained during 
times of stress. Therefore, the three generic practices in Capability Level 2 
constitute Target Profile 2 and must be implemented for process areas in Set 1. 
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As a result, the blank cells of Generic Practices of Capability Level 2 for process 
areas in Set 1 have been marked as Target Profile 2.  
 
For example, OSH Policy is to be implemented at Capability Level 2. To achieve 
Capability Level 2, Project S could implement the following Generic Practices: (1) 
‘to ensure that policy includes commitment to provide sufficient and appropriate 
resources’ (Generic Practice 2.1); (2) ‘to comply with applicable OSH legislation 
and with other requirements to which the organization subscribes’ (Generic 
Practice 2.3), and (3) ‘to clearly define responsibility, authority, and interrelation of 
personnel who manage, perform and verify work affecting safety’ (Generic 
Practice 2.2). 
 
Taking Risk Management for instance, to implement Generic Practice 2.1, the risk 
assessments need to be conducted by competent personnel who have adequate 
knowledge of the activities involved and the risk assessment technique adopted. 
To perform Generic Practice 3.2, regular monitoring needs to be carried out to 
check (1) the appropriateness of the control measure, (2) the effectiveness and 
timeliness of the risk and hazard identification and control implementation.    
 
For small entities, it is not recommended to upgrade the capability of the safety 
management system in a big quantum leap. Hence for Project S, after achieving 
Target Profile 2 if there are still available resources, practices of organizational 
process areas in Set 2 can be developed to help the design and implementation 
of existing process areas in Set 1. For example, as the safety management 
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system of Project S has been designed mainly according to Code of Practice 79, it 
can improve its existing process areas by referring to the suggestions of 
Singapore Standard 506. Therefore, the Specific Practices of process areas in Set 
2, and the Generic Practices in Capability Level 2, constitute Target Profile 3. As a 
result, the blank cells of Specific Practices and Generic Practices of Capability 
Level 2 for process areas in Set 2 have been marked as Target Profile 3. 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the ConSASS-2D audit result of Project L by practice. The 
safety management system of Project L is at Maturity Level 2 with all core / 
functional and organizational process areas implemented at Capability Level 2 
judged by the successive maturity stages marked by the dashed lines. Since core 
and organizational process areas have been managed and can be maintained 
during times of stress, the next objective could be to standardize these process 
areas with the ability to deal with changes so that this performance can be 
maintained and these standardized process areas customized for other projects. 
Therefore, the Generic Practices in Capability Level 3 of process areas in Set 1,  
the Generic Practices in Capability Level 3 of process areas in Set 2, constitute 
Target Profile 4 of Project L.  
 
If process areas in Set 1 and Set 2 have been standardized, then the next 
objective could be making the safety management data driven. Therefore, 
quantitative process areas could be developed to quantify the performance of 
process areas or the safety management system as a whole. Since the process 
areas have been standardized, the quantified performance or indicators will be 
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comparable across projects. Therefore, the practices of process areas in Set 3 
constitute Target Profile 5. As a result, the blank cells of practices for process 
areas in Set 3 have been marked as Target Profile 5. Till the achievement of 
Target Profile 4 and Target Profile 5, the safety management system of Project L 
will be in Maturity Level 3 which means the performance of the system will be 
quantitatively predictable.  
 
Project L can further advance to Maturity Level 4 to optimize its safety 
management system with process areas Performance Analysis and Casual 
Analysis Resolution. The cost-effectiveness of advanced safety programs 
promoted by authorities and other organizations can be analyzed, prioritized and 
performed. Root causes of safety issues and significant deviations with planned 
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Process Area GG1 GG2 GG3 
SPs GP2.1 GP2.2 GP2.3 GP3.1 GP3.2 
1.1 OSH policy       
1.2 Risk management       
1.3 Legal and other requirements 
management 
    TP4  
1.4 Responsibility and authority 
management 
      
1.5 Monitoring and control       
1.6 Emergency preparedness and 
response 
      
1.7 Accident and incident 
management 
    TP4  
2.1 Objectives and program(s) 
management 
 
     
2.2 Training     TP4  
2.3 communication management       
2.4 Management review     TP4  
3.1 Audit      TP5 
3.2 Performance measurement  TP5 TP5    
3.3 Document control       
4.1 Performance analysis TP6      
4.2 Causal analysis and resolution TP6      
 
 Failed practice                Passed practice at ML1 
    
 Passed practice at ML2  Passed practice at ML3 
 
          ML boundary 
 
Figure 6.6 The development strategy for Project L 
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter elaborated on the practical application of ConSASS-2D using two 
case studies. The ConSASS-2D audit results have been presented by practices 
and capability levels. The development status and strategies based on the 
ConSASS-2D audit results have been explained.  
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CHAPTER 7 COMPARISON OF CONSASS AND 
CONSASS-2D 
 
The objective of this chapter is to compare the properties of ConSASS-2D with 
ConSASS. The properties have been compared include the comprehensiveness, 
the organization of audit questions, audit principles, and the level definitions of the 
two audit systems.   
 
7.1 Audit Checklist of ConSASS 
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the ConSASS audit checklist. Risk 
Management has been chosen as an example. Audit questions pertaining to each 
system element of ConSASS are banded from I to IV to reflect the increasing level 
of development of the element. The first column of Table 7.1 shows the band level 
the audit question belongs to. The second column shows the serial number of the 
audit question. (The serial numbers of the system elements are those defined by 
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Table 7.1 The ConSASS audit questions on Risk Management 
Band S/No. Audit Question 
 2.1 Planning for hazard identification, risk assessment and risk control 
1 2.1.1 
Are the following procedures developed and implemented to facilitate 
OSH planning? 
1 2.1.1.1 
Broad level screening of major activities and facilities to identify focus 
areas for detailed risk assessment.  
1 2.1.1.2 
Ongoing identification of hazards for routine and non-routine activities of 
employees and non-employees.  
1 2.1.1.3 Assessment of risks of hazards identified. 
1 2.1.1.4 
Identification of control measures necessary for the control of the 
hazards identified. 
1 2.1.2 
Do all major activities have safe work procedures or other effective 
control measures developed and implemented based on the relevant 
risk assessment? 
1 2.1.3 
Id there evidence to show that risk assessment was reviewed 
periodically to ensure its suitability? 
2 2.1.4 
With reference to legal requirements and relevant codes of practice, are 
the control measures selected appropriate? 
2 2.1.5 
Does the organization‟s procedure for risk assessment meet the 
following requirements? 
2 2.1.5.1 
Proactive than reactive – initiated based on operation needs and 
forecast of events. 
2 2.1.5.2 
Provide for the classification of risks and identification of those that are 
eliminated or controlled by measures 
2 2.1.5.3 
Provide input into the determination of facility requirements; identification 
of training needs and/or development of operational controls 
2 2.1.5.4 
Provide for the monitoring of required actions to ensure both the 
effectiveness and timeliness of their implementation 
2 2.1.6 
Do job descriptions of personnel with OSH responsibilities make 
reference to the relevant risk assessment? 
3 2.1.7 
Was a baseline risk assessment conducted at an early stage of the OSH 
management system development process or when there are significant 
changes in the nature of work or business context? 
3 2.1.8 
Are there clear guidelines as to who needs to be involved in the risk 
assessment process? 
3 2.1.9 
Are the risk assessments conducted by personnel that have adequate 
knowledge of the activities involved and the risk assessment technique 
adopted? 
3 2.1.10 
Are employees, supervisors and managers who are familiar with the 
new process solicited for input on OSH design considerations? 
3 2.1.11 
Are there procedures to evaluate and ensure the continual effectiveness 
of risk controls? 
4 2.1.12 
Are control measures selected based on the concept of hierarchy of 
controls (elimination, engineering control, administrative control, then 
PPE)? 
4 2.1.13 
Are the variables that may limit the effectiveness of risk controls clearly 
identified in the risk assessments? 
4 2.1.14 
Are qualified OSH professional involved in the verification of the 
appropriateness and adequacy of design prior to operations? 
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7.2 The Comprehensiveness of ConSASS and ConSASS-2D 
In order to analyze the comprehensiveness of the ConSASS audit questions, the 
audit questions on Risk Management have been categorized according to the 
structure of the process area (Table 7.2). For brevity, audit questions have been 
simplified to the key points they cover. In Table 7.2, the questions are grouped by 
the capability levels (first column) of ConSASS-2D. The second column identifies 
the associated goals and practices defining that capability. The third column 
shows the paraphrased audit questions. The fourth column shows the 
corresponding serial number of audit questions in ConSASS, and the associated 
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Table 7.2 The ConSASS audit questions analyzed by process area structure  
CL 2D Audit Question 1D BL 
 PA1.2 
Planning for hazard identification, risk assessment and 
risk control (Have the requirements been met?) 
SE2.1 1 
 SG1&2 
All major activities have safe work procedures or other 
effective control measures developed and implemented 
based on the relevant risk assessment?  
2.1.2 1 
 SG1 Risk Assessment    
1 SP1.1 Identify work activities for hazard identification. 2.1.1.1 1 
1 SP1.2 Identify hazards for identified work activities.  2.1.1.2 1 
1 SP1.3 
Assess risks of hazards identified.  2.1.1.3 1 
Procedures for risk assessment are proactive, not reactive.  2.1.5.1 2 
Procedures for risk assessment provide for the classification 
of risks and identification of those that are eliminated or 
controlled by measures. 
2.1.5.2 2 
 SG2 Mitigate Risks   
1 SP2 
Identify and implement control measures for the controls of 
hazards identified.  
2.1.1.4 1 
Are the control measures selected appropriate?  2.1.4 2 
Are control measures selected based on the concept of 
hierarchy of controls (elimination, engineering control, 
administrative control, then PPE)?  
2.1.12 4 
2 GP2.1 
Are the risk assessments conducted by personnel that have 
adequate knowledge of the activities involved and the risk 
assessment technique adopted?  
2.1.9 3 
Are employees, supervisors and managers who are familiar 
with the new process, solicited for input on OSH design 
considerations?  
2.1.10 3 
Are qualified OSH professionals involved in the verification 
of the appropriateness and adequacy of design prior to 
operations?  
2.1.14 4 
Procedures for risk assessment provide input into the 
determination of: Facility requirements; identification of 
training needs and/or development of operational controls. 
2.1.5.3 2 
2 GP2.2 
Do job descriptions of personnel with OSH responsibilities 
make reference to the relevant risk assessment?  
2.1.6 2 
Are there clear guidelines as to who needs to be involved in 
the risk assessment process?  
2.1.8 3 
2 GP2.3 
Procedures for risk assessment provide the monitoring of 
required actions to ensure both the effectiveness and 
timeliness of their implementation.  
2.1.5.4 2 
Are there procedures to evaluate and ensure continual 
effectiveness of risk controls?  
2.1.11 3 
Are the variables that may limit the effectiveness of risk 
controls clearly identified in the risk assessments?  
2.1.13 4 
3 GP3.2 
Review risk assessment procedure to ensure its suitability.  2.1.3 1 
Was a baseline risk assessment conducted at an early state 
of the OSH management system development process or 
when there are significant changes in the nature of work or 
business context? 
2.1.7 3 
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At Capability Level 3 of ConSASS-2D, define a process area, two generic 
practices on communication and review are considered important to achieve this 
capability level. From the second column of Table 5.2, it can be found that 
Generic Practice 3.1 about communication is missing. ConSASS does not provide 
any audit questions about communication for Risk Management. However, Code 
of Practice on Risk Management emphasizes the importance of communication 
about specific hazards to the affected personnel. In addition, communication is an 
essential step to promote the implementation and standardization of a process 
area. There are two audit questions that can be extracted from the Code of 
Practice on Risk Management pertaining to communication:  
(1) Are various forms and levels of communication in place throughout the 
risk management process including specific communication of the 
hazards identified and their controls to the persons performing the 
activity?  
(2) Is feedback from employees, clients, suppliers or other stakeholders 
considered to revise the procedures and control measures of the 
process area?  
 
These two questions have been included into the ConSASS-2D audit checklist. 
The ConSASS-2D process area structure can be used to validate the 
comprehensiveness of audit questions and reveal missing aspects of a process 
area. This comprehensiveness is important because an audit system should cover 
all aspects of the effort that a project devotes to its safety.  
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7.3 The Types of Audit Questions  
The ConSASS audit questions on Risk Management from 2.1.1.1 to 2.1.1.4 
together with 2.1.2 are listed in Table 7.3. Their interrelationship is examined. 
 
Table 7.3 The ConSASS audit questions about goals and practices 
CL 2D Audit Question 1D BL 
1 SG1&2 
All major activities have safe work procedures or other 
effective control measures developed and implemented 
based on the relevant risk assessment?  
2.1.2 1 
1 SG1 Risk Assessment    
1 SP1.1 Identify work activities for hazard identification. 2.1.1.1 1 
1 SP1.2 Identify hazards for identified work activities.  2.1.1.2 1 
1 SP1.3 Assess risks of hazards identified.  2.1.1.3 1 
1 SG2 Mitigate Risks   
1 SP2 
Identify and implement control measures for the controls of 
hazards identified.  
2.1.1.4 1 
 
From Table 7.3, the statement of ConSASS 2.1.2 represents the overall goal of 
the specific practices. Audit questions about goals together with the audit 
questions about its supporting practices are often encountered in ConSASS. For 
an audit system without a goal-to-practice hierarchy, it is not clear which are the 
goals to satisfy and whether necessary practices have been involved to support 
the goals (Generic Practice 3.1 is missing in ConSASS). In addition, during the 
auditing of ‘goal and practice mixed together’ questions, audit procedures 
(evidence collection and assessment) may need to be performed repeatedly 
which may bring about duplicated effort.  
 
In ConSASS-2D, goals are broken down into sub-goals (if necessary) and are 
associated with the supporting practices. Audit questions check on the supporting 
practices to see whether the goal has been satisfied, and the degree to which the 
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goal has been satisfied, rather than ask a direct question as to whether a goal has 
been met. Furthermore, a clear goal - practice structure also goes some way 
(though not completely) towards reducing audit subjectivity. 
 
7.4 The Organization of Audit Questions 
The audit principle of ConSASS-2D is two-fold: (a) to check if required practices 
have been implemented; (b) to see if the practices are effective in accomplishing 
the safety goals of the project. Therefore, ConSASS 2.1.1.4 identification of 
control measures (Band Level 1) and ConSASS 2.1.4 appropriateness of control 
measures (Band Level 2) both are required to satisfy SP2 of ConSASS-2D. In 
ConSASS-2D they are not divided into different levels (Table 5.4).  
 
Table 7.4 The organization of ConSASS audit questions in Risk Management 
CL 2D Audit Question 1D BL 
 SG2 Mitigate Risks   
1 SP2 
Identify and implement control measures for the controls of 
hazards identified.  
2.1.1.4 1 
Are the control measures selected appropriate?  2.1.4 2 
2 GP2.1 
Are employees, supervisors and managers who are familiar 




Do job descriptions of personnel with OSH responsibilities 
make reference to the relevant risk assessment?  
2.1.6 2 
Are there clear guidelines as to who needs to be involved in 
the risk assessment process?  
2.1.8 3 
 
ConSASS 2.1.10 requires personnel familiar with the new process being involved 
during the design of this process area. If personnel who have been assigned to 
this process area are equipped with adequate knowledge and experience, 
Generic Practice 2.1 can support Generic Goal 2 effectively. ConSASS-2D deals 
with this situation by stating in the introductory notes referring to CPRM that: if 
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available, persons who are familiar with the design and development of the site, 
machine or process can be included in the risk management team. Hence the 
requirement in ConSASS 2.1.10 is optional for Generic Practice 2.1. Therefore, 
ConSASS-2D did not put this into the audit checklist. So the audited results of 
ConSASS-2D based on compulsory requirements effectively support the goal, 
and can accurately describe the effectiveness of the process area. However, 
ConSASS incorporates both compulsory requirements and optional ones together 
in the same band level; because of this, audit results cannot accurately describe 
the effectiveness of the system element. 
 
For each process area, the project managements has the flexibility to decide how 
detailed a practice is to be implemented. For Generic Practice 2.2 assign 
responsibility and authority, this practice can be marked as acceptable as long as 
the assignment of responsibility and authority is appropriate to the needs of the 
project, e.g. when events happen, there are personnel in charge. The project can 
also conduct a RACI matrix assignment mapping exercise. Clear roles and 
responsibilities are assigned to various persons in the management process. 
Doing so makes it clear who has been assigned to do what, and whether any key 
tasks have been left unassigned, and the workload of any individual. It also 
improves the quality of an audit if there is evidence that personnel have been 
assigned tasks. But it is not required to have a RACI map for the process area to 
pass Generic Practice 2.2. Therefore RACI matrix is only mentioned in the 
introductory notes. It can also appear as a required individual audit question only 
when necessary. For individual process areas, to further implement a practice 
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with many excellent characteristics will not gain the project a higher score. 
Additional effort in one generic practice cannot substitute for the required effort for 
other Generic Practices. Therefore if resources are limited, the structure of a 
process area of ConSASS-2D serves to promote a balanced development, rather 
than having the process area being well-developed in one aspect but neglected in 
other more important aspects.  
 
7.5 The Passing Criterion for Audit Questions  
ConSASS has four audit questions about Generic Practice 2.1 which is to provide 
adequate resources to perform this process area (Table 5.4). ConSASS-2D 
defines two kinds of resources for the performance of a process area, Generic 
Practice 2.1.1 is about competent human resources and Generic Practice 2.1.2 is 
about necessary physical facilities or equipment. From Table 7.5, it is found that 
the necessary physical equipment to implement the risk control measures, e.g. 
PPE, is not mentioned in ConSASS. ConSASS 2.1.9 requires personnel having 
adequate knowledge to be involved in the performance of this process area. 
However, it is subjective whether the knowledge of somebody is adequate.  
  
ConSASS-2D improves the objectivity of auditing by providing definite passing 
criterion for audit questions in the introductory notes when necessary. The 
objective of Generic Practice 2.1.1 is to provide competent personnel to ensure 
the procedures developed for this process area are effectively executed. This 
competence can be defined by knowledge and experience. ConSASS-2D 
provides clear guidelines on this in the introductory notes of this generic practice 
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referring to the Code of Practice on Risk Management: ‘Note: having attended a 
risk management course conducted by a Ministry of Manpower approved training 
provider or equivalent is sufficient’. Incorporating this consideration into 
ConSASS-2D provides clear and convincing audit criteria to judge whether the 
safety management system has passed the audit question. 
 
Table 7.5 ConSASS audit questions about Generic Practice 2.1 
CL 2D Audit Question 1D BL 
2 GP2.1 
Are the risk assessments conducted by personnel that have 
adequate knowledge of the activities involved and the risk 
assessment technique adopted?  
2.1.9 3 
Are employees, supervisors and managers who are familiar 
with the new process, solicited for input on OSH design 
considerations?  
2.1.10 3 
Are qualified OSH professionals involved in the verification of 
the appropriateness and adequacy of design prior to 
operations?  
2.1.14 4 
Procedures for risk assessment provide input into the 
determination of: Facility requirements; identification of 
training needs and/or development of operational controls. 
2.1.5.3 2 
 
7.6 Band Levels of ConSASS and Capability Levels of ConSASS-2D 
In ConSASS, the audit questions have been grouped into band levels with each 
increasing level reflecting the increasing development status of individual system 
elements. The side-by-side comparison of audit questions from ConSASS-2D and 
the original ConSASS shows that while there is a logical breakdown and 
progression of tasks and questions in ConSASS-2D, the same is not true of 
questions (and implied tasks) organized under band levels in ConSASS.  
 
Table 6.6 shows related ConSASS audit questions across band levels. From 
Table 6.6, it is found that for Specific Practice 2, identification of control measures 
is a requirement in Band Level 1, and appropriateness of control measures is 
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another requirement in Band Level 2; for Generic Practice 2.2, responsibility 
assignment is in Band Level 2, and providing guidelines for persons to be involved 
is in Band Level 3; for Generic Practice 2.3, continual effectiveness is in Band 
Level 3, and identification of the variables that limit the effectiveness of control 
measures is in Band Level 4.  
 
From the previous paragraph, it is realized that in ConSASS, for interrelated audit 
questions the audit questions in higher Band Levels require more detailed or 
advanced procedures than those in a lower band level. However, ConSASS 
cannot explain why a set of audit questions has been grouped in a certain band 
level rather than in other band levels. Moreover, the division of audit questions 
into band levels across all the system elements is not consistent. Therefore, the 
audited band levels are not comparable between system elements.  
 
Table 7.6 The ConSASS audit question across band levels 
CL 2D Audit Question 1D BL 
 PA1.2 
Planning for hazard identification, risk assessment and 
risk control (Have the requirements been met?) 
SE2.1  
 SG2 Mitigate Risks   
1 SP2 
Identify and implement control measures for the controls of 
hazards identified.  
2.1.1.4 1 
Are the control measures selected appropriate?  2.1.4 2 
2 
GP2.2 
Do job descriptions of personnel with OSH responsibilities 
make reference to the relevant risk assessment?  
2.1.6 2 
Are there clear guidelines as to who needs to be involved in 
the risk assessment process?  
2.1.8 3 
GP2.3 
Are there procedures to evaluate and ensure continual 
effectiveness of risk controls?  
2.1.11 3 
Are the variables that may limit the effectiveness of risk 
controls clearly identified in the risk assessments?  
2.1.13 4 
 
ConSASS-2D characterizes the development status of process area by the role 
and function of a group of practices. Capability Level 1 is characterized as SPs 
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covering the unique and core functions of a process area. The generic practices 
at Capability Level 2 represent the means to support or ensure the performance of 
specific practices during times of stress. Finally generic practices at Capability 
Level 3 help projects and organizations standardize a process area so that it can 
be used by multiple projects. Definitions of capability levels are consistent across 
all the process areas, and the audited capability levels of process areas are 
comparable.  
 
7.7 The Arrangement of the Advanced Audit Questions  
In Table 7.6, ConSASS 2.1.13 recommends the identification of variables limiting 
the effectiveness of risk controls.  People in the industry may find difficult to 
understand or have a clear idea about how to satisfy this audit question. 
Furthermore, it is not a mandatory requirement for the satisfaction of Generic 
Practice 2.3 Monitor and Control. ConSASS-2D provides a procedure serving this 
kind of ‘high level’ requirement. Project level ‘best practice’ and alternative ‘high 
level’ procedures can be placed in the introductory notes for individual process 
areas. The efficiency and cost-effectiveness of these ‘best practice’ and ‘high 
level’ procedures can be analyzed in the Performance Analysis process area at 
Maturity Level 4 which will help in the sharing of experience across projects.  
 
 
7.8 Audit Results Presented by Score Card  
Figure 7.1 shows an example of ConSASS-2D score card.  
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Figure 7.1 An example of ConSASS score card 
 
Because of the inconsistent band level definitions, system elements of ConSASS 
at the same numerical band level do not designate equal development status; 
therefore their performance levels are not comparable. Although the scores 
indicate which system elements are at a higher band level than others, users 
cannot determine which elements are weaker in terms of capability. This makes it 
more difficult to devise a development strategy. However, in ConSASS-2D 
consistent capability level definitions and audit criteria across all process areas 
make the comparison of performance across process areas possible and 
meaningful. Moreover, development stages for a safety management system in 
terms of maturity level also make it clear what additional functionality and 
  110 
performance is available, with the resulting benefit in terms of systemic qualities of 
the safety management system. The manner in which ConSASS-2D facilitates 
auditing and development planning will be elaborated by the case studies based 
on the safety management system of two real world projects. 
 
7.9 Summary 
A comparison of ConSASS-2D and ConSASS has been conducted to determine 
the differences in the underlying design, audit and planning principles. The use of 
development levels within a two dimensional framework enables a project to 
initiate the development of a safety management system in a pragmatic way. This 
is especially a point of concern for small and medium-sized organizations which 
have to focus their limited available resources on a safety management system of 
manageable scope which still covers the essential areas, rather than expend them 
implementing an exhaustive system that is beyond their capacity to operate and 
which proves to be ineffective. 
 
Process areas are not meant to work in isolation in their own „silos‟ of concerns / 
issues. Some of the goals and practices of different process areas are interrelated 
either in mutually supporting, dependent or cooperative arrangements. Individual 
practices from different process areas can help achieve outcomes that address 
issues at a system level. To achieve a balanced development of process areas 
with the same level of priority, consistent measurement of the development status 
in a process area is required. This is necessary to avoid the situation of projects 
spending wasted effort on well-developed process areas but neglecting poorly 
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developed ones. This consistency and objectivity of safety management system 
performance can be achieved by an audit scheme based on capability levels.  
 
Maturity levels provide a clear progression in the quality of a safety management 
system as it develops from one level to the next. Each higher maturity level builds 
upon the preceding one, and signifies a higher stage of system development. 
Projects have a finite duration, whereas process capabilities defining higher 
maturity levels require a long period of sustained effort. Therefore, many of the 
human and knowledge resources to implement process components for higher 
levels may have to reside at the corporate level, and transferred to the project 
level, and be transferred to the project level when new project safety management 
systems are set up. 
 
With consistent definitions of capability levels and maturity levels, it will also 
become possible to benchmark the effectiveness of the safety management 
system across the whole construction industry. This will enable resources and 
effort to be targeted to priority areas in the campaign to achieve the ambitious 
safety targets to reduce workplace fatalities to less than 1.8 per 100,000 workers 
by 2018.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the case studies and discussions in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the 
conclusions of this study are presented in this chapter. The contributions for 
theory and practice are discussed in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 
present research limitations and recommendations for future research.  
 
8.1 Contribution  
This study contributes to construction safety management and audit system by 
elaborating the logical relationship among safety process areas, goals and 
practices. It offers a better understanding of: (1) the relationship between goals 
and practices supporting safety process areas; (2) the interrelationship among 
safety process areas contributing to the quality of a safety management system 
as a whole; (3) the development strategy based on the achieved profile and target 
profile. 
 
The capability dimension of ConSASS-2D provides a systematic and logical 
methodology to design and audit individual process areas which are characterized 
by increasing capability Levels. The hierarchical structure of a process area 
provides the intent and purpose of performing certain practices and helps ensure 
that the success of process areas can be maintained and repeated in the future. 
The audit principle under ConSASS-2D is no longer to check whether something 
has been done, but emphasizes on whether the performance of practices can 
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effectively support the associated goal. Furthermore, sub-goals can be validated 
for the consistency and completeness against higher level goals. This ‘from-goal-
to-practice’ breakdown principle also helps reduce audit subjectivity.   
 
Consistent definitions of capability Levels bring about comparable performance of 
process areas so that weaker process areas deserving improvement effort can be 
easily distinguished. The auditability of performance in process areas has been 
improved since each capability level has been defined with the required practices. 
Capability levels cannot be skipped, and the practices in the lower capability level 
have priority over those in the higher capability level. When resources are limited, 
effort can be directed to the most needed procedures / activities with the guidance 
of the progressive capability levels in the capability dimension. 
 
A systematic way to integrate the requirements in different standards has been 
demonstrated. The integration is facilitated by the clear structure of process areas, 
resulting in less duplicated effort. The use of Introductory notes improves the 
understanding of practices during the implementation and auditing of process 
areas and helps reduce audit subjectivity. Simply implementing practices 
haphazardly will not gain the project a higher score in the audit. Exceptional 
practices and optional choices which exceed the development requirement of a 
capability level can be placed in the introductory notes of the process area, and 
used in preparation for further development of process areas at high maturity level.   
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Process areas are prioritized and grouped by their roles, function and contribution 
towards the overall qualities of the safety management system. The four 
sequential sets of process areas, characterized by increasing maturity level, with 
their increasing sophistication can mature a safety management system from a 
basic stage to an optimizing stage. ConSASS-2D has introduced two new process 
areas at Maturity Level 4, with the intention of providing a mechanism to analyze 
and prioritize the results of the adopted „best practices‟ so that performance goes 
„beyond the passing criteria‟ and the whole program is on the path of continuous 
improvement. Projects and organizations are free to scale and customize their 
safety management system at any stage according to their budget and / or 
expectation of the level of safety performance. Maturity levels can also be used to 
compare and benchmark the effectiveness of the safety management system 
across multiple projects.  
 
Development strategy can be generated based on ConSASS-2D framework 
taking into account the relationship between the goals and practices at a system 
level. With the help of the target profiles, projects and organizations can achieve 
the launch of a practical safety management with the consideration of the needs 
and expectations of the project. After an audit, projects can compare the 
ConSASS-2D audit result with the target profiles to identify the practices in 
process areas they need to fix for long term development. The use of target 
profiles helps guide the development effort along a smooth development path that 
prioritizes practices that are most needed thus allowing firms to derive the 
maximum benefit from the safety management. 
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8.2 Limitations  
This research has proposed a two-dimensional framework ConSASS-2D to guide 
the design, audit and planning of a safety management system. However, some 
limitations exist in the proposed framework and the research.  
 
Although interviews have been conducted with professors, approved safety 
auditors and professionals as this research developed, better-structured 
interviews and more discussions can be conducted if more safety professionals 
could be involved. Although two cases studies have been selected to discuss the 
development of current large and medium-sized construction safety management 
systems, more case studies would be helpful to present a more comprehensive 
view for the industry. Although development strategies have been recommended 
based on the audit results of ConSASS-2D, continual support and participation of 
the audited organizations will be helpful to validate the contribution of this study. If 
the government and authorities would like to provide the safety database, e.g., 
ConSASS audit results submitted to Ministry of Manpower, an overall 
development status of the construction safety management system can be 
depicted from past to the future. This research had been conducted primarily in 
the context of Singapore, and the interviews are solely with practitioners from the 
local construction industry. If ConSASS-2D is to be adopted abroad, overseas 
experiences and cases could be compared against those from Singapore.  
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8.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
In order to further develop this study, more professionals can be involved to 
evaluate and review the structure, definitions and compositions of ConSASS-2D 
so as to come to a consensus accepted by the construction industry. More 
projects, organizations and authorities can be continually involved to support the 
implementation and improvement of ConSASS-2D. A cost-benefit analysis can 
also be conducted to assess the feasibility of the target profiles proposed. 
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